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I. ORIGINALISM VERSUS LIVING 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: A FALSE DICHOTOMY 
In his famous critique of Roe v. Wade/ John Hart Ely re-
marked that if a principle that purportedly justifies a constitu-
tional right "lacks connection with any value the Constitution 
marks as special, it is not a constitutional principle and the Court 
has no business imposing it."2 Criticisms of Roe have generally 
proceeded precisely on this ground: the right to sexual privacy is 
not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, and there is no 
evidence that the framers and adopters of the 1787 Constitution 
or of any later amendments expected or intended the Constitu-
tion to protect a woman's right to abortion. It has become a 
commonly held assumption among Roe's critics that there is no 
constitutional basis for abortion rights or for a right of "privacy"; 
the right is completely made up out of whole cloth and therefore 
supporters of abortion rights have cut themselves adrift from the 
Constitution's text, history and structure. Even some defenders 
of abortion rights have bought into these criticisms; they view 
Roe v. Wade and privacy jurisprudence as a compelling reason to 
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1. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
2. John Hart Ely. The Wages of Crying Wolf' A Comment on Roe v. Wade. 82 
YALE L.J. 920. 949 (1973). 
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accept a version of living constitutionalism that grows and 
changes with the times. 
The conventional wisdom about Roe, however, is wrong. The 
right to abortion (although not the precise reasoning in Roe itself) 
actually passes the test that Ely set out. It is in fact based on the 
constitutional text of the Fourteenth Amendment and the princi-
ples that underlie it. That is so even though the framers and 
adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment did not expect or intend 
that it would apply to abortion. In this essay I offer an argument 
for the right to abortion based on the original meaning of the con-
stitutional text as opposed to its original expected application. 
I argue, among other things, that laws criminalizing abortion 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment's principle of equal citizen-
ship and its prohibition against class legislation. A long history of 
commentators has argued that abortion rights are secured by 
constitutional guarantees of sex equality premised on some ver-
sion of an antisubordination principle.3 One of the goals of this 
article is to show that the arguments of these commentators are 
not novel or fanciful but have deep roots in the original meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the arguments I present 
here, although specifically directed to the abortion controversy, 
help underscore the constitutional and originalist pedigree of 
much of the antisubordination literature. 
A second, and larger purpose of my argument is to demon-
strate why the debate between originalism and living constitu-
tionalism rests on a false dichotomy. Originalists generally as-
sume that if we do not apply the constitutional text in the way it 
was originally understood at the time of its adoption we are not 
following what the words mean and so will not be faithful to the 
Constitution as law. But they have tended to conflate two differ-
3. See, e.g .. CASS R. SUNSTEIN. THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 270--85 (1993): Reva 
Siegel. Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and 
Questions of Equal Protection. 44 STAN. L. REV. 261. 276--77, 350, 371-79 (1992); Guido 
Calabresi. The Supreme Court, 1990 Term, Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitu-
tional Accountabilitv (What the Bark-Brennan Debate lgnores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80. 
103-D8 (1991); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under the Law, 100 
YALE L.J. 1281. 1308-27 (1991): Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy. 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 737. 782 (1989); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON. TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF 
THE STATE 189-94 (1989): LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1354 
(2d ed. 1988); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 
955. 1020 (1984): Kenneth Karst. Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977): see also WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE 
SAID: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S MOST 
CONTROVERSIAL DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (opinions of Jack M. Balkin. 
Reva Siegel, Jed Rubenfeld, Robin West and Akhil Amar). 
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ent ideas- the expected application of constitutional texts, which 
is not binding law, and the original meaning, which is. Indeed, 
many originalists who claim to be interested only in original 
meaning, like Justice Antonio Scalia, have encouraged this con-
flation of original meaning and original expected application in 
their practices of argument.4 Living constitutionalists too have 
mostly accepted this conflation without question. Hence they 
have assumed that the constitutional text and the principles it 
was designed to enact cannot account for some of the most valu-
able aspects of our constitutional tradition. They object to being 
bound by the dead hand of the past. They fear that chaining our-
selves to the original understanding will leave our Constitution 
insufficiently flexible and adaptable to meet the challenges of 
our nation's future. By accepting mistaken premises about inter-
pretation- premises that they share with many originalists-
living constitutionalists have unnecessarily left themselves open 
to the charge that they are not really serious about being faithful 
to the Constitution's text, history and structure. 
The choice between original meaning and living constitu-
tionalism, however, is a false choice. I reject the assumption that 
fidelity to the text means fidelity to original expected applica-
tion. I maintain instead that constitutional interpretation re-
quires fidelity to the original meaning of the Constitution and to 
the principles that underlie the text. The task of interpretation is 
to look to original meaning and underlying principle and decide 
how best to apply them in current circumstances. I call this the 
method of text and principle. This approach, elaborated in Part 
II, is faithful to the original meaning of the constitutional text, 
and the purposes of those who adopted it. It is also consistent 
with a basic law whose reach and application evolve over time, a 
basic law that leaves to each generation the task of how to make 
sense of the Constitution's words and principles. Although the 
constitutional text and principles do not change without subse-
quent amendment, their application and implementation can. 
That is the best way to understand the interpretive practices of 
our constitutional tradition and the work of the many political 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 9-15. During the 1980s and 1990s most con-
servative originalists moved from a theory based on original intentions or original under-
standing to one focused on original meaning. They assumed that this would defend 
originalist methodology from various theoretical criticisms while preserving originalism's 
critique of liberal judicial decisions. However. as I describe later in this symposium. the 
shift to original meaning had unanticipated consequences. some of which my own work 
tries to draw out. See Jack M. Balkin. Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption. 
24 CONST. COMMENT. 427. 441-51 (2007). 
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and social movements that have transformed our understandings 
of the Constitution's guarantees. 
The right to abortion is a good test case for this approach to 
constitutional interpretation. Roe v. Wade is one of the canonical 
decisions of the present era, as Brown v. Board of Education' 
was for an earlier day, raising some of the most difficult and con-
troversial constitutional questions. If the method of text and 
principle can give a reasonable account of the constitutional 
right to abortion, then it is likely to have considerable explana-
tory power in other contexts as well. In Parts III-VI, I offer the 
case for abortion rights based on the original meaning of the 
constitutional text and its underlying principles. Of course peo-
ple can also use the same interpretive method to argue against 
the right to abortion. That is not a weakness of the approach-it 
shows how arguments from text and principle structure debate 
about constitutional rights over time between people who dis-
agree in good faith about the best way to interpret the Constitu-
tion. Nevertheless, I shall try to show why the arguments for the 
abortion right are the most powerful and convincing. 
Of course, demonstrating that the right to abortion flows 
from the Constitution's original meaning does not end the mat-
ter. It does not tell us, for example, how to reconcile this right 
with the state's legitimate interests in potential human life. The 
Constitution's original meaning does not require either Roe's 
trimester system6 or the later framework announced in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.7 These are 
judicial constructions that attempt to vindicate the purposes be-
hind the right and balance the relevant considerations. In Part 
VII of this essay, I offer a better way of approaching these ques-
tions, one that the Supreme Court did not adopt. The key, I shall 
argue, is to recognize that there are not one, but two different 
rights to abortion. The first right is a woman's right not to be 
forced by the state to bear children at risk to her life or health. 
The second right is a woman's right not to be forced by the state 
to become a mother and thus to take on the responsibilities of 
parenthood, which, in our society are far more burdensome for 
women than for men. As I shall explain, although the first right 
to abortion continues throughout pregnancy, the second right 
need not. It only requires that women have a reasonable time to 
5. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
6. 410 U.S. 113, 163--64 (1973) (outlining trimester system). 
7. 505 U.S. 833, 878--79 (1992) (replacing trimester system with line drawn at vi-
ability and undue burden test). 
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decide whether or not to become mothers and a fair and realistic 
opportunity to make that choice. Hence the second right to 
abortion is consistent with the view that the state's interests grow 
progressively stronger as the pregnancy proceeds. 
II. THE METHOD OF TEXT AND PRINCIPLE 
A. ORIGINAL MEANING VERSUS ORIGINAL EXPECTED 
APPLICATION 
Constitutional interpretation by judges requires fidelity to 
the Constitution as law. Fidelity to the Constitution as law 
means fidelity to the words of the text, understood in terms of 
their original meaning, and to the principles that underlie the 
text. It follows from these premises that constitutional interpre-
tation is not limited to those applications specifically intended or 
expected by the framers and adopters of the constitutional text. 
Thus, for example, the Eighth Amendment's prohibitions on 
"cruel and unusual punishments" bans punishments that are 
cruel and unusual as judged by contemporary application of 
these concepts (and underlying principles), not by how people 
living in 1791 would have applied those concepts and principles.R 
This marks the major difference between my focus on origi-
nal meaning and the form of originalism that has been popular-
ized by Justice Antonin Scalia and others.9 Justice Scalia agrees 
8. Many different scholars from different political perspectives have embraced the 
idea that constitutional interpretation should be grounded in the text's original meaning. 
See. e.g .. RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION 
OF LIBERTY (2004): Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term, Foreword: The 
Document and the Doctrine. 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 28-29, 31 (2000): KEITH 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL 
INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999): Ronald Dworkin. Comment. in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 115. 116-19 (Amy Gutman ed .. 
1997) (hereinafter Dworkin, Comment]: Ronald Dworkin. The Arduous Virtue of Fidel-
ity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1249 (1997); KERMIT 
ROOSEVELT. THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE OF SUPREME COURT 
DECISIONS (2006). 
9. See Antonin Scalia. Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849. 862-
64 (1989) (hereinafter Scalia. Originalism]: ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF 
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 144, 159 (1989): Antonin Scalia. 
Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United States Federal Courts 
in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws. in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAw 3, 17 (Amy Guttman ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia. Courts]: 
RAOUL BERGER. FEDERALISM: THE FRAMERS' DESIGN (1987); Clarence Thomas. Judg-
ing. 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1996). Although Justice Thomas also emphasizes that he 
looks to original meaning. he too tends to conflate original meaning and original ex-
pected application. See, e.g. Morse v. Frederick. 127 S. Ct. 2618. 2629. 2630 (2007) (Tho-
mas. J.. concurring) (deciding if First Amendment protects student speech by looking to 
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that constitutional fidelity requires fidelity to the original mean-
ing of the constitutional text, and the meanings that words had at 
the time they were adopted.10 He also agrees that the original 
meaning of the text should be read in light of its underlying prin-
ciples. But he insists that the concepts and principles underlying 
those words must be applied in the same way that they would 
have been applied when they were adopted. As he puts it, the 
principle underlying the Eighth Amendment "is not a moral prin-
ciple of 'cruelty' that philosophers can play with in the future, but 
rather the existing society's assessment of what is cruel. It means 
not ... 'whatever may be considered cruel from one generation to 
the next,' but 'what we consider cruel today [i.e., in 1791 ]'; other-
wise it would be no protection against the moral perceptions of a 
future, more brutal generation. It is, in other words, rooted in the 
moral perceptions of the time." 11 Scalia's version of "original 
meaning" is not original meaning in my sense, but actually a more 
limited interpretive principle, what I call original expected applica-
tion.12 Original expected application asks how people living at the 
time the text was adopted would have expected it would be ap-
plied using language in its ordinary sense (along with any legal 
terms of art). When people use the term "original understanding," 
and sometimes even "original meaning"- as Scalia does- they 
are actually talking about original expected application. Expecta-
practices of public schools in early 1800s and concluding that:'"If students in public 
schools were originally understood as having free-speech rights. one would have ex-
pected 19th-century public schools to have respected those rights and courts to have en-
forced them. They did not."): Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n. 514 U.S. 334, 359 
(Thomas, L concurring) (attempting to determine original meaning of First Amendment 
by looking to "whether the phrase 'freedom of speech. or of the press.· as originally un-
derstood, protected anonymous political leafleting.") 
10. Scalia. Courts. supra note 9. at 38 ("What I look for in the Constitution is pre-
cisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text. not what the original 
draftsmen intended."). 
11. Antonin Scalia. Response. in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 129, 140 (Amy Guttman ed .. 1997) [hereinafter Scalia. Re-
sponse]. 
12. See Jack M. Balkin. Original Meaning and Original Application. 
http:/lbalkin.blogspot.com/2005/06/original-meaning-and-original.html (last visited Aug. 
11. 2006). Ronald Dworkin similarly distinguishes between "semantic originalism" and 
'"expectations originalism": '"the crucial distinction between what some officials intended 
to say in enacting the language they used, and what they intended-or expected, or 
hoped-would be the consequence of their saying it." Dworkin. Comment, supra note 8. 
at 116. Randy Barnett endorses a similar idea. See BARNETT. RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 8. at 93-94. Mark Greenberg and Harry Littman have shown 
how original meaning and what I am calling original expected application may come 
apart over time. Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman. The Meaning of Original Meaning, 
86 GEO. L.J. 569 (1998). As we will see infra. however. although ·•expectations original-
ism" provides a useful shorthand. "semantic originalism" is a bit of a misnomer, because 
we are interested in more than semantics. i.e .. the dictionary definitions of words. 
2007] ABORTION AND ORIGINAL MEANING 297 
tion-focused originalists can accommodate new phenomena and 
new technologies -like television or radio- by analogical exten-
sion with phenomena and technologies that existed at the time of 
adoption. But this does not mean, Scalia insists, that "the very acts 
that were perfectly constitutional in 1791 (political patronage in 
government contracting and employment, for example) may be 
unconstitutional today." 13 
B. MISTAKES AND ACHIEVEMENTS 
Scalia realizes that his approach would allow many politi-
cally unacceptable results, including punishments that would 
shock the conscience of people today. So he often allows devia-
tions from his interpretive Rrinciples, making him what he calls a 
"faint-hearted originalist." 4 For example, Scalia accepts the New 
Deal settlement that gave the federal government vast powers to 
regulate the economy that most people in 1787 would never have 
dreamed of and would probably have strongly rejected. 15 
Scalia's originalism must be "faint-hearted" precisely be-
cause he has chosen a unrealistic and impractical principle of in-
terpretation, which he must repeatedly leaven with respect for 
stare decisis and other prudential considerations. The basic prob-
lem with looking to original expected application for guidance is 
that it is inconsistent with so much of our existing constitutional 
traditions.1" Many federal laws securing the environment, pro-
tecting workers and consumers-even central aspects of Social 
Security-go beyond original expectations about federal power, 
not to mention independent federal agencies like the Federal 
Reserve Board and the Federal Communications Commission, 
and federal civil rights laws that protect women and the disabled 
from private discrimination. Even the federal government's 
power to make paper money legal tender probably violates the 
expectations of the founding generation. 17 The original expected 
application is also inconsistent with constitutional guarantees of 
13. See Scalia. Response. supra note II. at 140-41. (emphasis in original). 
14. Scalia, Originalism. supra note 9. at 861-64. 
15. See, e.g .. Gonzales v. Raich. 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (Scalia. J.. concurring). 
16. See RICHARD H. FALLON. JR .. IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 15-17 
(2001): Henry Monaghan. Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication. 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 723.723-24.727-39 (1988). 
17. See Kenneth Dam, The Legal Tender Cases. 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 367.389 ("diffi-
cult to escape the conclusion that the Framers intended to prohibit" use of paper money 
as legal tender); Hearings Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary lOOth Cong .. 1st Sess. 
Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Part 1 at 84-85 (1987). 
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sex equality for married women,18 with constitutional protection 
of interracial marriage,19 with the constitutional right to use con-
traceptives,20 and with the modern scope of free speech rights 
under the First Amendment. 21 
The standard response to this difficulty is that courts should 
retain nonoriginalist precedents (i.e., those inconsistent with 
original expectation) if those precedents are well established, if 
they promote stability, and if people have justifiably come to 
rely on them. Interpretive mistakes, even though constitutionally 
illegitimate when first made, can become acceptable because we 
respect precedent. As Scalia explains, " [ t ]he whole function of 
the doctrine [of stare decisis] is to make us say that what is false 
under proper analysis must nonetheless be held true, all in the 
interests of stability."22 
There are four major problems with this solution. First, it 
undercuts the claim that legitimacy comes from adhering to the 
original meaning of the text adopted by framers and that deci-
sions inconsistent with the original expected application are ille-
gitimate. It suggests that legitimacy can come from public accep-
tance of the Supreme Court's decisions, or from considerations 
of stability or economic cost. 
Second, under this approach, not all of the incorrect prece-
dents receive equal deference. Judges will inevitably pick and 
choose which decisions they will retain and which they will dis-
card based on pragmatic judgments about when reliance is real, 
substantial, justified or otherwise appropriate. These characteri-
zations are likely to conflate considerations of stability and po-
tential economic expense with considerations of political accept-
ability- which decisions would be too embarrassing now to 
discard- and political preference-which decisions particularly 
rankle the jurist's sensibilities. Thus, one might argue that it is 
18. See Frontiero v. Richardson. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See infra text at notes 66--70. 
19. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
20. Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965): Eisenstadt v. Baird. 405 U.S. 438 
(1971). 
21. E.g .. Cohen v. California. 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (protecting public expressions of 
profanity): Brandenburg v. Ohio. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (protecting advocacy of sedition 
and law violation): New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding unconstitu-
tional aspects of common law of defamation): Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15 (1973) 
(protecting pornography that does not fall within a narrowly defined three part test): 44 
Liquormart. Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (protecting truthful nonmisleading 
commercial speech from paternalistic regulation): Scalia, Response. supra note 11. at 138 
(contemporary First Amendment protections are "irreversible" "whether or not they 
were constitutionally required as an original matter"). 
22. SCALIA. Response. supra note 11, at 139. 
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too late to deny Congress's power to pass the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 under the Commerce Clause but express doubts about the 
Endangered Species Act. One might accept that states may not 
engage in sex discrimination but vigorously oppose the constitu-
tional right to abortion or the unconstitutionality of anti-sodomy 
statutes. This play in the joints allows expectations-based 
originalism to track particular political agendas and allows 
judges to impose their political ideology on the law-the very 
thing that the methodology purports to avoid. 
Third, allowing deviations from original expected applica-
tion out of respect for precedent does not explain why these mis-
takes should not be read as narrowly as possible to avoid com-
pounding the error, with the idea of gradually weakening and 
overturning them, so as to return to more legitimate decision-
making. If the sex equality decisions of the 1970's were mistakes, 
courts should try to distinguish them in every subsequent case 
with the goal of eventually ridding us of the blunder of recogniz-
ing equal constitutional rights for women. 
This point leads naturally to the final, and more basic prob-
lem: Our political tradition does not regard decisions that have 
secured equal rights for women, greater freedom of speech, fed-
eral power to protect the environment, and federal power to 
pass civil rights laws as mistakes that we must unhappily retain; it 
regards them as genuine achievements of American constitu-
tionalism and sources of pride. These decisions are part of how 
and why we understand ourselves to be a nation that has grown 
freer and more democratic over time. No interpretive theory 
that regards equal constitutional rights for women as an unfor-
tunate blunder that we are now simply stuck with because of re-
spect for precedent can be adequate to our history as a people. It 
confuses achievements with mistakes, and it maintains them out 
of a grudging acceptance. Indeed, those who argue for limiting 
constitutional interpretation to the original expected application 
are in some ways fortunate that previous judges rejected their 
theory of interpretation; this allows them to accept as a starting 
point nonoriginalist precedents that would now be far too em-
barrassing for them to disavow. 
By contrast, a focus on text and principle views most, if not 
all of these achievements as plausible constructions of constitu-
tional principles that underlie the constitutional text and that 
must be fleshed out in doctrine.23 As I shall describe later on, 
23. For a related argument. see ROOSEVELT. supra note 8: FALLON. supra note 16. 
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equal rights for women are fully consistent with the original 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and its underlying prin-
ciples of equal citizenship and opposition to caste and class legis-
lation.24 We need not regard decisions recognizing women's 
equal rights as mistakes: quite the contrary, they are our genera-
tion's attempt to make sense of and implement the Constitu-
tion's text and its underlying principles. These decisions-and 
others like them- do not sacrifice constitutional fidelity on the 
altar of precedent; they demonstrate how development of judi-
cial doctrine over time can implement and maintain constitu-
tional fidelity. It is rather those who would retreat from the 
achievements of our constitutional tradition or accept them only 
grudgingly who lack fidelity, because they lack faith in the ability 
and the authority of succeeding generations to accept the Consti-
tution as their Constitution and to make constitutional text and 
constitutional principles their own. 
A central difference between expectations-based original-
ism and the method I advocate is that my approach recognizes 
the great achievements of our country's constitutional tradition 
as achievements and as signs of progress rather than as devia-
tions and mistakes that sacrifice legitimacy and legality for the 
sake of stability and respect for precedent. A second important 
difference concerns how these two theories understand post-
enactment history and the work of social movements. Original 
expectation originalism holds that social movements and politi-
cal mobilizations can change constitutional law through the 
amendment process of Article V. They can also pass new legisla-
tion, as long as that legislation does not violate the original ex-
pected application-as much federal post-New Deal legislation 
might. But no matter how significant social movements like the 
civil rights movement and the women's movement might have 
been in our nation's history, no matter how much they may have 
changed Americans' notion of what civil rights and civil liberties 
belong to them, they cannot legitimately alter the correct inter-
pretation of the Constitution beyond the original expected appli-
cation. For example, no matter how profoundly the second wave 
of American feminism altered our sense of what equality be-
tween men and women requires, it cannot change the original 
Randv Barnett achieves a similar result through a combination of what he calls constitu-
tionai interpretation and constitutional construction. See BARNETI. supra note 8. at 118-
27. The latter term is borrowed from KEITH WHITIINGTON. CONSTITUTIONAL 
CO!\STRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999). 
24. See infra text at notes 66-76. 
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expected application of the Constitution. under which married 
women did not have equal civil rights."' The federal government 
can pass civil rights laws (assuming that these do not run afoul of 
the original expected application of the Commerce Power). But 
judges are not authorized to subject sex discrimination to consti-
tutional scrutiny. At best we might maintain the mistaken deci-
sions of the 1970s that found sex equality guarantees in the Con-
stitution because it would be politically impossible to reject them 
and because women have come to rely on them. 
The model of text and principle views the work of social 
movements and post-enactment history quite differently. The 
constitutional text does not change without Article V amend-
ment. But each generation of Americans can seek to persuade 
each other about how the text and its underlying principles 
should apply to their circumstances. their problems, and their 
grievances. And because conditions are always changing, new 
problems are always arising, and new forms of social conflict and 
grievance are always being generated and discovered, the proc-
ess of argument and persuasion about how to apply the Constitu-
tion's principles in new contexts is never-ending. 
When people try to persuade each other about how the 
Constitution and its principles apply to their circumstances, they 
naturally identify with the generation that framed the constitu-
tional text and they claim that they are being true to its princi-
ples. They can and do draw analogies between the problems, 
grievances and injustices the adopters feared or faced and the 
problems, grievances, and injustices of our own day. They also 
can and do draw on the experiences and interpretive glosses of 
previous generations-like the generation that produced the 
New Deal or the civil rights movement-and argue that they are 
also following in their footsteps. 
Most successful political and social movements in America's 
history have claimed authority for change in just this way: either 
as a call to return to the enduring principles of the Constitution 
or as a call for fulfillment of those principles. Thus, the key 
tropes of constitutional interpretation by social movements and 
political parties are restoration on the one hand, and redemption 
on the other. Constitutional understandings change by arguing 
about what we already believe, what we are already committed 
to, what we have promised ourselves, what we must return to 
and what commitments remain to be fulfilled. 
25. See infra text at notes 66-70. 
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When political and social movements succeed in persuading 
other people in the country that their interpretation is the right 
one, they replace an older set of implementing constructions and 
doctrines with a new one.26 These constructions and implementa-
tions may not be just or correct judged from the standpoint of 
later generations, and they can be challenged later on. But that is 
precisely the point. Each generation makes the Constitution 
their Constitution by calling upon its text and its principles and 
arguing about what they mean in their own time. Interpreting 
the Constitution's text and principles is how each generation 
connects back to the past and forward to the future. 
Thus, it matters greatly, from the standpoint of text and 
principle, that there was a women's movement in the early 
1960's and 1970's that convinced Americans that both married 
and single women were entitled to equal rights and that the best 
way to make sense of the Fourteenth Amendment's principle of 
equal citizenship was to apply it to women as well as men, de-
spite the original expected application of the adopters. The equal 
protection decisions of the 1970's that gave heightened scrutiny 
to sex-based classifications are not "mistakes'' that we must 
grudgingly live with. They are applications of text and principle 
that have become part of our constitutional tradition through the 
work of social movements and popular mobilizations. They 
might be good or bad applications; they might be incorrect or in-
complete. That is for later generations to judge. But when peo-
ple accept them, as Americans accept the notion of equality for 
women today, they are not simply doing so on the basis of reli-
ance interests-i.e. that we gave women equal rights mistakenly 
in the 1970's, and now it's just too late to turn back. They are do-
ing so in the belief that this is what the Constitution actually 
means, that this is the best, most faithful interpretation of consti-
tutional text and principles. 
26. I have explained how change in constitutional understandings operates through 
social movement mobilization and the party system in Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levin-
son. From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State. 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 489 (2006): Jack M. Balkin. How Social Movements Change (Or Fail To Change) 
the Constitution: The Case of the New Departure. 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27 (2005): Jack 
M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson. Understanding the Constitutional Revolution. 87 VA. L. 
REV. 1045 (2001 ). Judges have no obligation to pay attention to social movements, and 
interpretations of the Constitution are not good ones simply because social movements 
have adopted them. Nevertheless. waves of social and political mobilizations have shaped 
the development and understanding of our Constitution. and contributed to some of its 
most admirable features. A theory of constitutional interpretation should be able to ex-
plain why these changes in understanding are faithful to the Constitution rather than just 
mistakes. For further discussion of this point. see Balkin. supra note 4. at 470-78, 507-11. 
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Originalism based on original expected application fails be-
cause it cannot comprehend this feature of constitutional devel-
opment except as a series of errors that it would now be too em-
barrassing to correct. Justice Scalia correctly and appropriately 
notes that his reliance on nonoriginalist precedents is not consis-
tent with originalism, but rather a "pragmatic exception. "27 And 
that is precisely the problem with his view: The work of social 
movements in our country's history is not a "pragmatic excep-
tion" to fidelity to the Constitution. It is the lifeblood of fidelity 
to our Constitution-an ongoing project of vindicating text and 
principle in history. 
In this way, the theory of text and principle explains-in a 
way that original expectation originalism cannot-why the Con-
stitution is more than the dead hand of the past, but is a continu-
ing project that each generation takes on. It is a great work that 
spans many lifetimes, a vibrant multi-generational undertaking, 
in which succeeding generations pledge faith in the constitu-
tional project and exercise fidelity to the Constitution by making 
the Constitution their own. 
None of this means that the original expected application is 
irrelevant or unimportant. It helps us understand the original 
meaning of the text and the general principles that animated the 
text. But it is important not as binding law but rather as an aid to 
interpretation, one among many others. It does not control how 
we should apply the Constitution's guarantees today, especially 
as our world becomes increasingly distant from the expectations 
and assumptions of the adopters' era. The concepts embodied by 
the words of constitutional text and the principles underlying the 
text, and not their original expected application, are the central 
concern of constitutional interpretation. 
C. IMPLEMENTING TEXT AND PRINCIPLES 
Although the original expected application is not binding, 
the constitutional text is. That is because we have a written Con-
stitution that is also enforceable law. We treat the Constitution 
as law by viewing its text and the principles that underlie the text 
as legal rules and legal principles. To do this we must ask what 
the people who drafted the text were trying to achieve in choos-
ing the words they chose, and, where their words presume un-
derlying principles, what principles they sought to endorse. 
27. Scalia. Response. supra note 11. at 140. 
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We look to the original meaning of the words because if the 
meaning of the words changed over time, then the words will 
embrace different concepts than those who had the authority to 
create the text sought to refer to. We look to underlying princi-
ples because when the text uses relatively abstract and general 
concepts, we must know which principles the text presumes or is 
attempting to embrace. If we read the text to presume or em-
brace other principles, then we may be engaged in a play on 
words and we will not be faithful to the Constitution's purposes. 
Just as we look to the public meaning of words of the text at the 
time of enactment, we discover underlying constitutional princi-
ples by looking to the events leading up to the enactment of the 
constitutional text and roughly contemporaneous with it. 2g Some-
times the text refers to terms of art or uses figurative or non-
literal language. For example, the Copyright Clause in Article I, 
Section 8 speaks of "writings," which is a non-literal use. It refers 
to more than written marks on a page but also includes printing 
and (probably) sculpture, motion pictures, and other media of 
artistic and scientific communication.2" The term "due process of 
law" in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is a term of art; it 
has a specialized legal meaning over and above the concatena-
tion of the words in the phrase. In cases like these we must try to 
figure out what principles underlie the term of art or the use of 
figurative or non-literallanguage.3(1 
28. Enactment history. however. is not the only thing we might look at to assess 
underlying principles. See Balkin. supra note 4. at 486-503. 
29. See also Scalia. Courts. supra note 9. at 37-38 (the text of the First Amendment 
must be construed as a synecdoche in which .. speech .. and .. press .. stand for a whole 
range of different forms of expression. including handwritten letters). 
30. Ronald Dworkin's distinction between .. semantic originalism .. and "expecta-
tions originalism ... Dworkin. Comment. supra note 8. at 116. may be a little misleading 
here. The term .. semantic originalism .. might suggest that Dworkin is making a distinc-
tion between semantics-the dictionarv definitions of words-and pragmatics-the 
meanings of words in use or context. The problem is that original meaning-either in 
Dworkin's sense or mine-cannot be limited to semantics. It is clearly also about prag-
matics. that is. meaning in use and context. For example. Dworkin agrees that if we dis-
cover that certain words like .. bill of attainder .. were employed as terms of art. we must 
use that specialized meaning and not the dictionary definition of the individual words 
employed. Dworkin. Reflections on Fidelity. 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1799. 1806-08 (1997). 
That is a claim about pragmatics. not semantics. In like fashion. we need to know 
whether. in context of use. what seems to be abstract language in the constitutional text 
(say of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause) is attempting to embrace 
an abstract principle. or whether it was understood in context at the time to refer to a 
laundrv list of relativelv specific applications. That too. is a question of pragmatics rather 
than s~mantics. Some parts of the constitutional text were intended and expected in or-
dinarv usage to embrace relatively abstract principles. while others were not. because-
for example- they were generally understood to be terms of art. The language used is a 
clue. but learning more about the surrounding history might change our minds on this 
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Underlying principles are necessary to constitutional inter-
pretation when we face a relatively abstract constitutional com-
mand rather than language that offers a fairly concrete rule, like 
the requirement that there are two houses of Congress or that 
the President must be 35 years of age. When the text is relatively 
rule-like, concrete and specific, the underlying principles cannot 
override the textual command. For example, the underlying goal 
of promoting maturity in a President does not mean that we can 
dispense with the 35 year age requirement." But where the text 
is abstract, general or offers a standard, we must look to the 
principles that underlie the text to make sense of and apply it.32 
Because the text points to general and abstract concepts, these 
underlying principles will usually also be general and abstract. 
Indeed, the fact that adopters chose text that features general 
and abstract concepts is normally the best evidence that they 
sought to embody general and abstract principles of constitu-
tional law, whose scope, in turn, will have to be fleshed out later 
on by later generations. Nevertheless recourse to underlying 
principles limits the direction and application of the text and 
therefore is essential to fidelity to the Constitution. 
Some principles are directly connected to particular texts 
and help us understand how to apply those texts. Other princi-
ples are inferred from the constitutional structure as a whole.33 
score. See Keith Whittington. The New Originalism. 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599. 610-
11 (2004). 
In the case of the Fourteenth Amendment. we know that its language was written to 
please both Moderates and Radicals. Precisely for this reason the language chosen was 
about citizenship in general and not specifically about race discrimination. and its future 
scope was left deliberately ambiguous. as a delegation to future generations. Alexander 
Bickel. The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision. 69 HARV. L. REv. 1. 
59-63 (1955) (Moderates and Radicals chose ''language capable of growth'' that would 
paper over differences between them): WILLIAM E. NELSON. THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCfRINE 143-45 ( 1988) (lan-
guage of Section One deliberately chosen to invoke broad statements of principle. leav-
ing applications unsettled). See the discussion in Balkin. supra note 4. at 456-61. Hence if 
we are concerned with pragmatics-use in context-there is no good reason to treat the 
Fourteenth Amendment's general clauses as limited to a laundry list of specific applica-
tions. 
31. In this example I assume that all the evidence we have suggests that the words 
"attained to the age of thirty-five years" in Article II. section 4. were chosen to serve as a 
rule. not a principle or standard. and. similarly. that there is no evidence that the words 
should be understood in a non-literal sense. as in the case of the word "writings" in the 
Copyright Clause. 
32. As Randy Barnett reminds us. these underlying principles cannot override the 
textual command but must be articulated and applied consistent with it. Randy Barnett, 
Underlying Principles. 24 CONST. COMMENT. 405 (2007). See also Balkin. supra note 4. at 
481-86. 
33. John Hart Ely famously criticized the notion of a "clause bound interpretivism." 
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For example, there is no single separation of powers clause in 
the Constitution; rather we must derive the principle of separa-
tion of powers from how the various institutions and structures 
outlined in the constitutional text relate to each other. The prin-
ciple of democracy-which includes the subprinciple that courts 
should generally defer to majoritarian decision-making-is no-
where specifically mentioned in the constitutional text, and yet it 
may be the most frequently articulated principle in constitutional 
argument. It is. ironically, the principle that people most often 
use to object to courts inferring constitutional principles not spe-
cifically mentioned in the text. 34 Although the principle of de-
mocracy does not directly appear in the text, it is inferred from 
various textual features which presume democracy, and from the 
basic character of our government as a representative and de-
mocratic republic. 
Finally, many other materials gloss text and principles and 
help apply them to concrete circumstances. These include not 
only the original expected application but also post-enactment 
history, including the work of social movements that have 
changed our constitutional common sense, and judicial and non-
judicial precedents. These materials offer interpretations about 
how to understand and apply the Constitution's structures and 
guarantees. They are entitled to considerable weight. Precedents 
in particular not only implement and concretize principles, they 
also help settle difficult legal questions where reasonable people 
can and do disagree.35 Precedents also help promote stability and 
rule of law values. However, because glosses and precedents ac-
cumulate and change over time, and because they often point in 
contrasting directions, they are not always dispositive of consti-
tutional meaning. 
Constitutional doctrines created by courts, and institutions 
and practices created by the political branches, flesh out and im-
JOHN HART ELY. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 11-41 
(1980) while Charles Black emphasized reading the Constitution in terms of its larger 
structural themes. CHARLES BLACK, JR.. STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969). 
34. In fact. Ely argued that the principle justified courts inferring certain rights and 
liberties against majorities because they were necessary to democracy and to republican 
government. ELY. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST. supra note 33. The principle of democ-
racy is not the same thing as simple majoritarianism; it does not automatically assume the 
legitimacy of whatever procedures for decision-making happen to be in place. 
35. For a useful discussion of how judicial and non-judicial precedents can serve the 
goals of text and principle without displacing them. see Amar, supra note 8, at 43-44. 78-
89 (2000); see also FALLON. supra note 16; ROOSEVELT. supra note 8 (offering theories 
for implementing constitutional meaning in doctrine). 
2007] ABORTION AND ORIGINAL MEANING 307 
plement the constitutional text and underlying principles. But 
they are not supposed to replace them. Doctrines, institutions 
and practices can do the work of implementation well or poorly 
depending on the circumstances, and some implementations that 
seem perfectly adequate at one point may come to seem quite 
inadequate or even perverse later on. But the Constitution, and 
not interpretations of the Constitution, is the supreme law of the 
land. Therefore it is always available to later generations to as-
sert- and to try to convince others- that the best interpretation 
of text and principle differs from previous implementing glosses, 
and that we should return to the correct interpretation, creating 
new implementing rules, practices and doctrines that will best 
achieve this end. The tradition of continuous arguments about 
how best to implement constitutional meaning in our own time 
produces changes in constitutional doctrines, practices, and law. 
That is why, ultimately, there is no conflict between fidelity to 
text and principle and practices of constitutionalism that evolve 
over time. Indeed, if each generation is to be faithful to the Con-
stitution and adopt the Constitution's text and principles as its 
own, it must take responsibility for interpreting and implement-
ing the Constitution in its own era. 
D. FIDELITY AND INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
Expectations-based originalists may object that the text-
and-principle approach is indeterminate when the text refers to 
abstract standards like ''equal protection" rather than concrete 
rules. Therefore it does not sufficiently constrain judges. That 
might be so if text and principle were all that judges consulted 
when they interpreted the Constitution. But in practice judges 
(and other constitutional interpreters) draw on a rich tradition of 
sources that guide and constrain interpretation, including pre-
and post-enactment history, original expected application, previ-
ous constitutional constructions and implementations, structural 
and inter-textual arguments, and judicial and non-judicial prece-
dents, to name only a few. In practice, judges who look to text 
and principle face constraints much like those faced by judges 
who purport to rely on original expected application. As we have 
seen, the latter cannot and do not use original expected applica-
tions for a very large part of their work, because a very large part 
of modern doctrine is not consistent with original expected ap-
plication. So even judges who claim to follow the original under-
standing are, in most cases, guided and constrained by essentially 
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the same sources and modalities of argument as judges employ-
ing the method of text and principle. 
I think there is a deeper problem with the objection that the 
method of text and principle does not sufficiently constrain 
judges. Many theories of constitutional interpretation conflate 
two different questions. The first is the question of what the 
Constitution means and how to be faithful to it. The second asks 
how a person in a particular institutional setting -like an un-
elected judge with life tenure-should interpret the Constitution 
and implement it through doctrinal constructions and applica-
tions. The first is the question of fidelity; the second is the ques-
tion of institutional responsibility. 
Theories about constitutional interpretation that conflate 
these two questions tend to view constitutional interpretation 
from the perspective of judges and the judicial role; they view 
constitutional interpretation as primarily a task of judges and they 
assess theories of interpretation largely in terms of how well they 
guide and limit judges. For example, one of the standard argu-
ments for expectations-based originalism is that it will help con-
strain judges in a democracy. Alexander Bickel's theory of the 
passive virtues and Cass Sunstein's idea of "minimalism," al-
though often described as theories of constitutional interpretation, 
are actually theories about the judicial role and how judges should 
interpret the Constitution. So, too, obviously, are other theories of 
"judicial restraint." From the perspective of these theories, non-
judicial interpreters are marginal or exceptional cases that we ex-
plain in terms of the standard case of judicial interpretation. 
I reject this approach. Theories of constitutional interpreta-
tion should start with interpretation by citizens as the standard 
case; they should view interpretation by judges as a special case 
with special considerations created by the judicial role. In like 
fashion, constitutional interpretations by executive officials and 
members of legislatures are special cases that are structured by 
their particular institutional roles. Instead of viewing constitu-
tional interpretation by citizens as parasitic on judicial interpre-
tation, we should view it the other way around. 
Why emphasize the citizen's perspective? Each generation 
must figure out what the Constitution's promises mean for them-
selves. Many of the most significant changes in constitutional 
understandings (e.g., the New Deal, the civil rights movement, 
the second wave of American feminism) occurred through mobi-
lizations and counter-mobilizations by social and political 
movements who offered competing interpretations of what the 
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Constitution really means. Social and political movements often 
understand their grievances and their demands in constitutional 
terms- they argue for either a restoration of constitutional prin-
ciples or a redemption of constitutional commitments. They 
make claims about how the Constitution's text and principles 
should be cashed out in present-day circumstances. Social and 
political movements argue that the way that Constitution has 
been interpreted and implemented before-for example, by 
judges or other political actors-is wrong and that we need tore-
turn to the Constitution's correct meaning and redeem the Con-
stitution's promises in our own day. 
Often people do not make these claims in lawyerly ways, 
and usually they are not constrained by existing understandings 
and existing doctrine in the way that we want judges to be con-
strained. In fact, when social movements initially offer their con-
stitutional claims, many people regard them as quite radical or 
"off the wall." There was a time, for example, when the notion 
that the Constitution prohibited what we now call sex discrimi-
nation seemed quite absurd. Yet it is from these protestant in-
terpretations of the Constitution that later constitutional doc-
trines emerge. Many of the proudest achievements of our 
constitutional tradition came from constitutional interpretations 
that were at one point regarded as crackpot and "off the wall." 
I hasten to add that most of these arguments go nowhere. 
Only a few have significantly changed how we look at the Consti-
tution. Successful social and political movements must persuade 
other citizens that their views are correct, or, at the very least, 
they must convince people to compromise and modify their views. 
If movements are successful, they change the minds of the general 
public, politicians and courts. This influence eventually gets re-
flected in new laws, in new constitutional doctrines, and in new 
constitutional constructions. Successful social and political mobili-
zation changes political culture, which changes constitutional cul-
ture, which, in turn, changes constitutional practices outside of the 
courts and constitutional doctrine within them. 
The causal influences, of course, do not run in only one di-
rection. Judicial interpretations like those in Brown v. Board of 
Education or Miranda v. Arizona36 can become important parts 
of our constitutional culture; they can be absorbed into ordinary 
citizens' understandings of what the Constitution means, and 
they can act as focal points for citizen reaction. Nevertheless, we 
36. 384 U.S. 486 (1966). 
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cannot understand how constitutional understandings change 
over time unless we recognize how social movements and politi-
cal parties articulate new constitutional claims, create new con-
stitutional regimes and influence judicial constructions. 
To understand how these changes could be faithful to the 
Constitution, we must have a theory that makes the citizen's per-
spective primary. I do not claim that all social mobilizations that 
produce changes in doctrine are equally legitimate or equally 
admirable. But some are both legitimate and admirable, and a 
theory of constitutional interpretation- which is also a theory of 
constitutional fidelity- must account for them. The text -and-
principle approach can offer a much better explanation of how 
successful social and political movements make claims that are 
faithful to the Constitution than expectations-based originalism 
can. Indeed, as we have seen, expectations-based originalism is 
virtually useless for this purpose, because it views many of the 
most laudatory changes in our understandings of the Constitu-
tion as not faithful to the Constitution and therefore illegitimate. 
For similar reasons, expectations-based originalism cannot 
really constrain judges because too many present-day doctrines 
are simply inconsistent with it; as a result judges must pick and 
choose based on pragmatic justifications that are exceptions to 
the theory. Because expectations-based originalism conflates the 
question of constitutional fidelity with the question of judicial 
constraint, it offers the wrong answer to both questions. 
Constraining judges in a democracy is important. But in 
practice most of that constraint does not come from theories of 
constitutional interpretation. It comes from institutional features 
of the political and legal system. Some of these are internal to 
law and legal culture, like the various sources and modalities of 
legal argument listed above. Others are "external" to legal rea-
soning but nevertheless strongly influence what judges produce 
as a group. 
First, judges are subject to the same cultural influences as 
everyone else- they are socialized both as members of the pub-
lic and as members of particular legal elites. Second, the system 
of judicial appointments and the practices of partisan entrench-
ment determine and limit who gets to serve as a judge. Third, 
lower federal courts are bound to apply Supreme Court prece-
dents. Fourth, the Supreme Court is a multi-member body 
whose decisions in contested cases are usually decided by the 
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median or "swing" Justice. Over time, this keeps the Court's 
work near the center of public opinion.37 
This combination of internal and external features con-
strains judicial interpretation in practice far more effectively 
than any single theory of interpretation ever could; it does much 
of the work in constructing which constitutional interpretations 
are reasonable and available to judges and which are "off the 
wall." Equally important, this combination of internal and exter-
nal factors keeps judicial decisions in touch with popular under-
standings of our Constitution's basic commitments, continually 
translating, shaping and refining constitutional politics into con-
stitutional law. 
In short, we should not confuse the question of what it takes 
for actors in the system- including those actors who are not 
judges- to be faithful to the Constitution with the question of 
what features of the system constrain judicial interpretation. We 
must separate these questions to understand how constitutional 
fidelity occurs over time. When we do, we can also see why fidel-
ity to original meaning and belief in a living Constitution are not 
at odds. 
III. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Even if the right to abortion was not specifically contem-
plated or intended by the framers and adopters of the Constitu-
tion, it might follow as a consequence of principles that underlie 
the constitutional text. What text and what principles would 
those be? In Roe v. Wade itself, Justice Blackmun, invoking a 
history of previous judicial precedents, argued that the right 
came from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which says that "[n]o state ... shall ... deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."3 Many 
people doubt that the Due Process Clause regulates more than 
procedures, because the text refers to "due process of law." 
In fact, the Due Process Clause, as originally understood, 
did have some substantive content. "Due process of law" was a 
term of art thought to be roughly synonymous with the idea of 
"law of the land" from Magna Carta.w It was designed not only 
37. See sources cited supra note 26. 
38. U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV.§ 1. 
39. See James W. Ely Jr.. The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Realitv in the 
Origins of Substantive Due Process. 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315 (1999): Murray's Lessee v. 
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to prohibit unfair procedures but also to protect vested rights-
for example, vested rights of property- from being destroyed b~ 
government or transferred from one private party to another. 
Even under this reading, however, it is unclear whether the right 
to abortion is such a vested right. (Moreover, as I shall describe 
later on, the meaning of the term of art "due process of law" 
changed during the antebellum period. There is considerable 
evidence that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment may have been designed in part to enforce the 
Amendment's prohibition on so-called class legislation, which is 
also one of the underlying purposes of the Equal Protection 
Clause.41 ) 
Many people assume that the only possible source of the 
right to abortion would be a right to "privacy" found in the Due 
Process Clause, because that is where the Supreme Court found 
it in Roe v. Wade. Because they are unconvinced that the Due 
Process Clause offers substantive protections, or because they 
doubt that the right to privacy was intended to be one of those 
protections, they assume that the right to abortion has no consti-
tutional basis. 
Even if the right to abortion is not a vested right protected 
under the Due Process Clause, however, that does not mean that 
the right to abortion has no constitutional basis in the original 
meaning of the constitutional text or the principles underlying 
the text. The source of the right is the Fourteenth Amendment, 
but not necessarily the Due Process Clause. In fact, the other 
parts of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are far 
more relevant to this question. The first section of the Four-
teenth Amendment contains a Citizenship Clause, which states 
that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside." It contains a Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause, which says that "[n]o State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States." And it contains an 
Equal Protection Clause, which holds that "[n]o state ... 
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws. "42 
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co .. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272. 276 (1856). 
40. Ely. supra note 39, at 332-33. 
41. See infra text accompanying notes 47-53. 
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.§ 1. 
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The reason why the courts look to the Due Process Clause 
today is because of the Supreme Court's initial misinterpretation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Slaughter-House Cases43 in 
1873. The Slaughter-House Cases severely limited the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, mangled the constitutional text and caused 
enormous mischief in subsequent years. Because the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause was effectively read out of the Constitution, 
litigators and courts turned instead to the Due Process Clause 
(and still later to the fundamental rights doctrines arising out of 
the Equal Protection Clause) to do much of the work that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause should have performed. 
The purpose of the Citizenship, Privileges or Immunities, 
and Equal Protection Clauses, and indeed of the entire Four-
teenth Amendment, was to secure equal citizenship, equal civil 
rights, and civil equality for all citizens of the United States. 
(The Equal Protection Clause, which speaks of "person[s] within 
[the) jurisdiction" of states, extended basic rights to resident 
aliens as well.) The principle of civil equality meant that all per-
sons were equal before the law with respect to basic civil rights, 
which were the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States, and that the states could not make arbitrary or invidious 
discriminations among persons. 
One of the best summaries of the principles underlying the 
text of the Fourteenth Amendment is the speech that Senator 
Jacob Howard of Michigan gave when he introduced the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Senate on May 23, 1866. Howard was 
a member of the Joint House-Senate Committee on Reconstruc-
tion (the Committee of Fifteen) that drafted the Amendment, 
and he acted as the floor manager for the Amendment in the 
Senate, presenting it with a speech that stated the Committee's 
official views about the Amendment's purposes. 44 
Howard explained that the purpose of section one of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was to "disable [the states] from pass-
ing laws trenching upon those fundamental rights and liberties 
which belong to every citizen of the United States and to all per-
sons who happen to be within their jurisdiction."45 (Thus, How-
ard assumed that aliens as well as citizens would enjoy basic civil 
rights against state governments). The "great object" of the 
43. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
44. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong .. 1st Sess. 2764-68 (1866) (statement of Sen. How-
ard). 
45. /d. at 2766. 
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Privileges or Immunities Clause was '"to restrain the power of 
the States and compel them at all times to respect these great 
fundamental guarantees."~" Howard emphasized that these privi-
leges and immunities of citizenship "cannot be fully defined in 
their entire extent and precise nature."~7 Many of them were un-
enumerated. He offered as a preliminary sampling the list pro-
duced by Justice Bushrod Washington in Corfield v. Coryell,-!8, 
who was interpreting the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, section 2.49 Washington himself noted that the privi-
leges and immunities of citizenship could not be exhaustively 
enumerated, but that they included. among other things, the 
rights to "protection by the government, [to] enjoyment of life 
and liberty ... to pass through, or to reside in any other state, ... 
to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus: to institute and 
maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state [and] to 
take, hold and dispose of property."'" "[T]o these.'' Howard, ex-
plained, "should be added the personal rights guaranteed and 
secured by the first eight amendments to the Constitution,"'1 that 
is, the individual rights guarantees of the Bill of Rights.'c 
The Equal Protection Clause, together with the Due Proc-
ess Clause, Howard explained, was designed to "abolish[] all 
class legislation in the States and do[] away with the injustice of 
subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to an-
other."'3 Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment "establishes 
46. /d. 
47. /d. at 2765. 
48. Corfield v. Coryell. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3.230). 
49. Note that for ·Howard. as for the manv of the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. the words .. Privileges or Immunities ~f citizens of the United States .. were 
deliberately chosen to mirror the phrase '"Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the 
Several States .. in Article IV. Section 2. Just as states could not deny basic civil rights to 
non-citizens because of Article IV. Section 2. they now could not deny basic civil rights to 
their own citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
50. Corfield. 6 F. Cas. at 551-52. 
51. CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong .. 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard). 
52. Although the list of fundamental rights was not limited to those specifically 
mentioned in the Constitution. and although Justice Washington had included suffrage in 
his list. Howard cautioned that the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not guarantee the 
right to vote: .. The right of suffrage. is not. in Jaw. one of the privileges or immunities 
thus secured by the Constitution:· !d. at 2766. Speaking in 1871. John Bingham also sug-
gested that some of the rights listed in Corfield had a different status than the individual 
rights provisions of the Bill of Rights. which he viewed as central examples of substantive 
rights protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. CONG. GLOBE. 42d Cong .. 1st 
Sess. app. at 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham). See Michael Kent Curtis. Resurrect-
ing che Privileges or Immunicies Clause and Revising the Slaughter-House Cases Wichouc 
Exhuming Lochner: Individual Righcs and the Fourteenth Amendment. 38 B.C. L. REV 1. 
70-71 (1996). 
53. /d. Howard explained: 
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equality before the law, and it gives to the humblest, the poorest, 
and the most despised of the race the same rights and the same 
protection as it gives to the most powerful, the most wealthy, or 
the most haughty."54 
The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equality before 
the law prohibited several different types of unequal treatment, 
each of which overlapped with the others.'' The first was legisla-
tion that made arbitrary and unreasonable distinctions between 
citizens or persons.56 The second was "special" or "partial" legis-
lation that picked out a group for special benefits or special bur-
dens. This is generally what was meant by "class legislation," an 
idea that has its roots in Jacksonian ideology.57 The third was 
"caste" legislation, that is, legislation that created or maintained 
It prohibits, the hanging of a black man for a crime for which the white man is 
not to be hanged. It protects the black man in his fundamental rights as a citizen 
with the same shield which it throws over the white man. Is it not time. Mr. 
President. that we extend to the black man. I had almost called it the poor privi-
lege of the equal protection of the law~ Ought not the time to be now passed 
when one measure of justice is to be meted out to a member of one caste while 
another and a different measure is meted out to the member of another caste. 
both castes being alike citizens of the United States. both bound to obey the 
same taws. to sustain the burdens of the same Government. and both equally 
responsible to justice and to God for the deeds done in the body? 
/d. Although Howard began by referring to both the Equal Protection Clause and the 
Due Process Clause in his account: his reference to "equal protection of the law" sug-
gests the Equal Protection Clause was expected to take the lead in securing equality. 
Nevertheless. the Due Process Clause was also relevant to the general prohibition against 
class legislation. because the antebellum idea of due process also included the notion that 
laws should be general and impartial and not for the benefit of any particular class. See 
Mark G. Yudof. Equal Protection, Class Legislation and Sex Discrimination: One Small 
Cheer For Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics. 88 MICH. L. REV. 1366. 1376 (1990) ("The 
idea that laws should be general and not tainted by considerations of class or caste was 
widely recognized and accepted before the fourteenth amendment was enacted. It was 
part-and-parcel of the presumed fairness of governmental processes. of due process of 
law."): Melissa L. Saunders. Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness. 96 
MICH. L. REV. 245,258-59 & n.58 (1997): Ely. supra note 39. at 337-38. 
54. CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong .. 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard). 
55. The various strands are described in NELSON. supra note 30. at 115-47 and in 
Yudof. supra note 53 (reviewing Nelson). 
56. See NELSON. supra note 30. at 115. 138-42. 
57. See Yudof. supra note 53. at 1376-77: Saunders. supra note 53. at 289-90 & 
n.198 (1997): NELSON supra note 30. at 115. 149: HOWARD GILLMAN. THE 
CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWER 
JURISPRUDENCE. 46-60. 62 (1993). In his 1832 veto message concerning the charter of 
the second national bank. Andrew Jackson gave a canonical account of the equal protec-
tion principle: The law should make no "artificial distinctions. to grant titles. gratuities. 
and exclusive privileges. to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful." •·If [taw] 
would confine itself to equal protection. and. as Heaven does its rains. shower its favors 
alike on the high and the low. the rich and the poor. it would be an unqualified blessing." 
Andrew Jackson. Veto Message (July 10. 1832). in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS 576-89 (Richardson ed .. 1897). 
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a disfavored caste or subordinated a group through law.58 The 
fourth was legislation that selectively restricted or abridged basic 
rights of citizenship and that therefore treated people as second-
class citizens.59 
The job of doctrine in constitutional interpretation is to 
concretize and make applicable the abstract commitments of 
constitutional text and constitutional principle.60 Where the text 
is concrete and determinate, no doctrinal gloss is necessary, and 
doctrine may not contradict it. Doctrine does most of its work 
when textual commitments are abstract and the principles that 
underlie them are also abstract. That is the case with the Four-
teenth Amendment. When courts create doctrine to implement 
and actualize text and principle, they create tests that are pre-
sumably easier to manage and apply to concrete cases; but, in 
the process, they may create rules that are underinclusive and 
overinclusive with respect to the best understanding of constitu-
tional text and principles. Moreover, over time, the doctrinal 
tests and tools that courts create to apply constitutional text and 
principle may become increasingly unwieldy and inadequate to 
enforce and implement the textual and principled commitments 
in the Constitution. Or courts may simply make initial mistakes 
58. See CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong .. 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Howard) 
(Fourteenth Amendment ··does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons 
to a code not applicable to another"): see also id. at 674 (remarks of Sen. Sumner) (pro-
posed joint resolution for Reconstruction-a predecessor of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment-would abolish "oligarchy. aristocracy. caste. or monopoly with particular privi-
leges and powers"): Adamson v. California. 332 U.S. 46.51 n.8 (1947) (quoting Sumner's 
joint resolution as evidence of meaning of Fourteenth Amendment): ANDREW KULL. 
THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 74-75 (1992) (also quoting Sumner's joint resolution 
as evidence of meaning of Fourteenth Amendment). 
59. CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong .. 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Stevens) 
("This amendment ... allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States. so 
far that the law that operates upon one man shall operate equally upon all.") (emphasis 
in original). John Harrison and David Currie have argued that equality of treatment with 
respect to basic civil rights was guaranteed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. and 
not the Equal Protection Clause. which applies to non-citizens as well. See John Harri-
son. Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 101 YALE L.J. 1385. 1387-88 
(1992): DAVID CURRIE. THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST 
HUNDRED YEARS 342-51 (1985). Harrison argues that the Equal Protection Clause was 
quite limited in its reach by modern day standards. and mostly protected against dis-
criminatory remedies and protections or discriminatory enforcement by executive offi-
cials. Harrison. supra. at 1390. 1396. 1435-38. However. Senator Howard's speech sug-
gests that the Equal Protection Clause was the text that embodied the principle against 
class. caste. and subordinating legislation. See CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong .. 1st Sess. 2766 
(1866) (remarks of Sen. Howard). 
60. For useful accounts of this process. see FALLON. supra note 16: see also 
ROOSEVELT. supra note 8: Amar. The Document and The Doctrine. supra note 8. 
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that misapply or even undermine the constitutional text and 
principles. 
The doctrinal implementation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment from Reconstruction onward bears all of these characteris-
tics. The Court's initial construction of the text in the Slaughter-
House Cases adopted a narrow construction of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause that essentially made the clause irrelevant. 
The Slaughter-House Court was worried that a broad reading of 
the clause would take too much power from the states and place 
it in the hands of Congress, which had the power to protect privi-
leges and immunities by federal legislation. However, the 
Court's crabbed reading was not faithful to the constitutional 
text and underlying constitutional principles because the Privi-
lege or Immunities Clause was supposed to be the Amendment's 
major source for constitutional protection of both civil liberty 
and civil equality. 
Because the Court made the clause practically irrelevant, 
lawyers offered arguments for fundamental rights during the 
19th and 20th centuries in terms of the liberty protected by the 
Due Process Clause. Litigants argued, and the Court eventually 
agreed, that the Due Process Clause protected certain substan-
tive rights from abridgement by the states. This created consid-
erable resistance over the years because the Due Process Clause 
by its terms seems to refer to fair processes (and, as we have 
seen, historically, the protection of vested rights). Discovering 
fundamental rights in the Due Process Clause made far less 
sense than asking whether such rights were privileges or immuni-
ties of national citizenship. That is especially so given that the 
text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause clearly seems to refer 
to a series of unspecified substantive rights against government. 
In the middle of the 20th century, the Supreme Court briefly 
flirted with protecting fundamental rights through the Equal 
Protection Clause."1 But the same criticism could apply here as 
well: why does a clause about equal protection guarantee par-
ticular substantive rights? Thus, the Court's decision in Slaugh-
ter-House helped delegitimate the protection of basic rights and 
liberties of citizenship that was one of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's central purposes. 
To make matters worse, for many years the Supreme Court 
assumed that the individual rights provisions of the Bill of Rights 
61. Shapiro v. Thompson. 394 U.S. 61R (I '169): Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections. 383 
u.s. 663. 668 (1966 ). 
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were not privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States, even though there is considerable evidence that the for-
mulation "Privileges or Immunities of citizens of the United 
States" specifically referred to these rights."2 Indeed, Senator 
Howard's speech introducing the Amendment in the Senate spe-
cifically noted that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected 
"the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight 
amendments to the Constitution,"63 The Court slowly began to 
incorporate these rights into the Fourteenth Amendment many 
years later, arguing that they were part of the "liberty" protected 
by the Due Process Clause. By the late 1960's most (but not all) 
of the individual rights provisions of the Bill of Rights had been 
so incorporated. However, there is little reason to think that the 
Due Process Clause was the primary vehicle through which the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights applied against the states. Once 
again, the doctrinal structure bequeathed by the Slaughter-
House Cases made the process of constitutional interpretation 
far more counterintuitive than it should have been. 
During the twentieth century, the Court implemented the 
equal citizenship, caste legislation and class legislation principles 
by creating a set of doctrines of scrutiny for different types of 
classifications.''4 However, it is by no means clear that a focus on 
classifications is the same thing as a focus on equal citizenship, 
caste legislation, or class legislation. Governments need not en-
gage in overt classification in order to subordinate a group or to 
impose special benefits or burdens. Rather, we know whether 
law subordinates by its social meanings and its effects within ex-
isting social and political structures. Focusing on classification 
sometimes does protect against legislation that promotes social 
subordination and the maintenance of caste, but at other times it 
does not. Hence the doctrinal focus on classification often under-
62. For a discussion. see AKHIL AMAR. THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCIION (1998). See also Richard L. Aynes. On Misreading John Bighman and 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 103 YALE L. J. 57 (1993): MICHAEL KENT CURTIS. No 
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
(1985). 
63. CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong .. 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard). 
64. See, e.g .. United States v. Carolene Products Co .. 304 U.S. 144. 153 n.4 (1938) 
(special scrutiny for laws that burden discrete and insular minorities): Loving v. Virginia. 
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (strict scrutiny for racial classifications): Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 
(1968) (strict scrutiny for classifications burdening illegitimacy): Graham v. Richardson. 
403 U.S. 365 (1971) (strict scrutiny for state classifications burdening alienage); Craig v. 
Boren. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (heightened scrutiny for sex classifications): Cleburne v. Cle-
burne Living Center. Inc .. 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (heightened rational basis scrutiny for 
classifications based on prejudice or animus). 
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protects. Sometimes the doctrine overprotects too, causing con-
stitutional difficulties for laws and policies that do not maintain 
~aste~rel.ations ?r second class c~tizenship .and. max actually assist 
m rehevmg vanous forms of socral subordmatron. · 
In interpreting the Constitution, therefore, we should al-
ways understand doctrine as a means to an end, and not as an 
end in itself. We should understand it as a good faith attempt by 
courts, sometimes successful, and other times less so, to imple-
ment relatively abstract commitments we find in the original 
meaning of the constitutional text and its underlying principles. 
Sometimes the solutions that courts come up with to flesh out 
text and principle are good enough for the immediate purposes 
at hand, but prove increasingly unworkable or contrary to the 
text and its underlying principles as glosses are placed upon 
glosses and as time and circumstances change. When novel prob-
lems present themselves, revealing the limitations of previous 
implementations of text and principle, we must always be pre-
pared to rethink the doctrinal structure in light of these more ba-
sic objects of constitutional fidelity. We should always attempt to 
develop and employ constitutional doctrine with text and princi-
ple in mind. 
In Roe v. Wade the Supreme Court found the constitutional 
right to abortion in the substantive protections of the Due Proc-
ess Clause. It is likely, however, that the real source of this right 
lies elsewhere. To determine whether rights to abortion are 
guaranteed by the Constitution, we must ask whether laws re-
stricting abortion deny women equal citizenship. They might do 
so because these laws are class or caste legislation or because 
they help create or maintain second class citizenship or a subor-
dinate status for women in American society. Or they might do 
so because they deny privileges or immunities of national citi-
zenship. If the answer to either of these questions is yes, then we 
should interpret or extend constitutional doctrine to include and 
protect abortion rights. 
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION AND EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 
Laws that discriminate against women and keep them in 
conditions of dependency violate the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Equal Protection Clause because they violate the principles 
65. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel. The American Civil Rights Tradition: 
Anticlassification or Anrisubordination?. 58 U. MIA\11 L. REV. 9 (2003). 
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against class legislation, caste legislation, and subordinating leg-
islation. The Congress that drafted the Fourteenth Amendment 
assumed that its guarantees applied to all persons, men and 
women alike, and that men and women were civil equals; but 
they were complacent about a whole range of laws and practices 
that effectively kept women in a subordinate condition and eco-
nomically dependent on men.06 In particular, they did not expect 
that the new amendment would disturb the common law cover-
ture rules, under which married women surrendered most of 
their common law rights under the fiction that they consented 
upon marriage to the merger of their legal identity into their 
husband's."7 Although the framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment asserted that women and men were civilly equal, they as-
sumed that existing laws and practices-including coverture-
did not deny women equal citizenship or subordinate them.68 The 
effect of these rules was to place most women in positions of 
second-class citizenship, for most women moved fairly quickly 
from living in their father's house to that of their husband. As 
Justice Bradley explained in his 1873 concurrence in Bradwell v. 
Illinois,69 which upheld a general prohibition on women becom-
ing members of the Illinois Bar, "[i]t is true that many women 
are unmarried and not affected by any of the duties, complica-
tions, and incapacities arising out of the married state, but these 
66. Thus. Akhil Amar notes that ·•[t]he Fourteenth Amendment. in some ways. was 
designed to give everyone - all persons. all citizens - certain civil rights. These rights were 
largely defined by the status of unmarried white women."' Akhil Reed Amar. Women 
and the Constitution. 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 465. 468 (1995). However. as Amar 
also notes. when women married. they lost most of these rights. See id. at 468 n.l4. See 
also Ward Farnsworth. Women Under Reconstruction: The Congressional Understanding. 
94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1229. 1241 (2000) (''Until she joined a family as a wife and mother. a 
femme sole [i.e .. an unmarried woman] was a family of one and could hold property: but 
once she married. her property rights yielded to the order of the family circle. She then 
enjoyed vicariously the rights held by the men in the family.""). 
67. Similar reasoning was used to justify women's exclusion from the franchise. See 
Reva B. Siegel. She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, 
and the Famill'. 115 HARV. L. REV. 947. 981-84 (2002) (noting that both common law 
coverture rule.s and theory of virtual representation of women by their husbands and fa-
thers stemmed from republican theory of household as the unit of society. and the head 
of the household as the representative of its dependents). 
68. See CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong. 1st session. at 1089 (Feb. 28. 1866) (remarks of 
Rep. Bingham) (noting that states would retain ability to regulate married women's 
ownership of property because property rights were governed by local law while "[t]he 
rights of life and liberty are theirs [i.e .. women's] whatever States may enact"); CONG. 
GLOBE. 39th Cong .. 1st Sess. 1064 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Stevens) (""When a distinction 
is made between two married people or two femmes sole. then it is unequal legislation: 
but where all of the same class are dealt with in the same way then there is no pretense of 
inequality."). 
69. 83 U.S. 130 (1873). 
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are exceptions to the general rule. The paramount destiny and 
mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of 
wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of 
civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of 
things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases."70 
Nevertheless, in interpreting the Constitution we must dis-
tinguish between the original meaning of the text and its original 
expected application. Fidelity to the Constitution requires only 
the first; not the second. We are interested in the text that the 
adopters wrote and the basic principles they sought to establish, 
not how they expected that text and those principles would be 
applied to concrete cases. 
The first wave of American feminism challenged the sexist 
assumptions of the generation that formulated the Fourteenth 
Amendment; their efforts culminated in the Nineteenth 
Amendment, which bestowed political equality on women. The 
debate over and subsequent ratification of the Nineteenth 
Amendment fatally undermined the premise on which the com-
mon law rules of coverture had been based, namely, that men 
adequately represented women's interests.71 If women had the 
right to vote because men did not adequately represent their in-
terests in political life, it seemed to follow that men did not nec-
essarily adequately represent all of their interests in economic 
and social life. If women were deemed competent to make the 
most important political decisions affecting the future of the re-
public through the franchise, it was hard to maintain that they 
lacked competence to make basic decisions about their own lives 
that involved entering into contracts and owning and disposing 
of property. Years later the second wave of American feminism 
convinced Americans that laws that discriminate against women 
violate basic principles of equal citizenship in our Constitution.72 
The original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
guarantees civil equality and equality before the law for all per-
sons, therefore presents no bar to the conclusion that sex dis-
70. !d. at 141--42. Bradwell was decided the day after Slaughter-House. with all of 
the Slaughter-House dissenters joining the majority. Only Chief Justice Chase dissented 
in Bradwell without opinion. 
71. Siegel. supra note 67. at 987-93. 1012-19: id. at 1019 (""[I]n the immediate af-
termath of ratification. both the Supreme Court and Congress understood the Nine-
teenth Amendment to redefine citizenship for women in ways that broke with the marital 
status traditions of the common law. But neither the Court nor Congress acted consis-
tently on this understanding."). 
72. Reva B. Siegel. Constitwional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitu-
tional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA. 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006). 
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crimination violates the Constitution. The text of section 1 does 
not exclude women from its protections, and the underlying 
principle of equal citizenship applies to men and women 
equally.73 This fact exemplifies one of the major differences be-
tween an approach to constitutional interpretation based on 
original meaning and an approach based on original understand-
ing or original intentions. While an approach grounded in origi-
nal understanding or original intention has great difficulty justi-
fying the Supreme Court's sex equality jurisprudence beginning 
with Reed v. Reed74 and Frontiero v. Richardson,75 an approach 
based on original meaning does not. The fact that Congress in 
1972 had submitted the ERA to the states (which ultimately 
failed to gain ratification by three fourths of the states) does not 
by itself demonstrate that constitutional protection of sex equal-
ity is inconsistent with original meaning. Rather, it demonstrates 
only, as the Supreme Court noted in Frontiero, that by 1972 
"Congress itself ha[ d] concluded that classifications based upon 
sex are inherently invidious. "76 
Assuming then, that women as well as men are protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment's equal citizenship principle, the 
next question is whether laws criminalizing abortion violate that 
principle. 
One might argue that, because only women can become 
pregnant, laws restricting abortion do not violate sex equality, 
because they do not treat women differently from similarly situ-
ated men. There are no similarly situated men. The principle of 
equal citizenship, however, is not limited to the requirement that 
laws be formally equal in this way. 77 The relevant question is not 
whether men and women are different in their capacity to bear 
children, but the difference that this difference should be al-
lowed to make in terms of women's status in society and their 
enjoyment of basic rights of citizenship. The text of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and principles underlying the Amendment 
stand for the propositions that the state may not create or main-
tain a lower caste of citizens, impose second-class citizenship, or 
effect subordination of a social group through law. When the 
73. That is not true of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. which presumes 
that women had no constitutional right to vote, but which was also superseded by the 
Nineteenth Amendment. 
74. 404 u.s. 71 (1971 ). 
75. 411 u.s. 677 (1973). 
76. !d. at 687. 
77. See Saunders. supra note 53. at 288-89, 287 n.189 (class legislation was legisla-
tion that was not general in its effects. but imposed special burdens.). 
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state uses women's capacity to become pregnant as a lever to 
subordinate women, assign them a second class status in society, 
or deny them full and equal enjoyment of their rights of citizen-
ship, it violates the equal citizenship principle. It may not use 
pregnancy as a device to deny women equal citizenship or sub-
ordinate women precisely because only women can get pregnant. 
Traditionally, blacks have been relegated to second class 
status by separation, degredation, and the abuse of the criminal 
justice system. But the lower status of women in society has been 
produced through enforcing role differentiation between the 
sexes, usually justified by paternalism and repeated appeals to 
nature and biological differences between men and women. 
Women's inequality has come not from separating them from 
men, but by making sure that they are remitted to traditional oc-
cupations of home and family and through denying them oppor-
tunities beyond those activities socially marked as "women's 
work." We see this ideology clearly in Justice Bradley's argu-
ment that women could be excluded from the bar because "[t]he 
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble 
and benign offices of wife and mother. "7H 
Laws that criminalize abortion impose special burdens on 
women not suffered by men. They force women to do two 
things. First, they require women to bear children against their 
will. They require a woman's body to undergo the strains of 
pregnancy and the difficulties of childbirth without her consent. 
In some cases, these may risk her health or even her life. 
Second, laws that criminalize abortion require women, 
against their will, to become mothers, with all that this word im-
plies. Motherhood is more than a purely biological relationship: 
it comes with a set of social and moral expectations and conven-
tions. When a child comes into the world, social pressure, legal 
rules, and moral obligations demand that parents take care of 
the child until it is fully grown. These responsibilities are life-
transforming. Moreover, in our society these responsibilities fall 
asymmetrically on women and men: that is to say, they fall more 
heavily on mothers than on fathers. Women still bear the most 
significant share of responsibility for child care; women have 
traditionally been and still are expected to subordinate their in-
terests and ambitions for the purpose of raising children. They, 
and not men, are far more likely to be blamed for shirking the 
responsibilities of raising children or failing to care for them. So-
78. 83 U.S. 130. 141 (1873). 
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ciety places shame and stigma on women who surrender their 
children for adoption. Such women are regarded as failures as 
mothers, not because they failed in their biological ability to give 
birth, but because they failed at the social role of caring for their 
children, which is the social meaning of motherhood. It is one 
thing if women freely choose to become mothers, assume the 
physical burdens and risks of pregnancy and childbirth, and take 
on the various social roles and expectations of motherhood in 
our society. It is quite another when the state forces them against 
their will to undergo these physical strains and dangers and to 
take on these life-altering responsibilities and obligations. Then 
it denies them their liberty in the most profound way. 
The asymmetrical expectations about responsibility for par-
enting that our society places on men and women are part of a 
larger structure of sex role differentiation, and part of a larger 
system of economic and status relations between men and 
women that reproduces and maintains inequality between men 
and women both within families and across society. As noted 
above, historically the inequality of women in society has been 
achieved through laws, institutions and practices that either push 
or require women to devote themselves primarily to traditional 
uncompensated gendered roles as caregivers while making 
women dependent on the economic support of men or the state. 
Laws that force women to become mothers against their will 
help maintain the unequal and subordinate status of women in 
society because they help commit women, against their will, to 
lives of domestic labor and economic dependency. Because 
criminalization of abortion helps place women in a socially de-
pendent status and keep them there, such laws constitute class 
legislation. They force women either to devote themselves to 
traditional roles and responsibilities of childcare that lack both 
status and economic remuneration or else suffer the stigma and 
shame of admitting their inability to care for their own children 
by placing them up for adoption. Thus, they employ basic social 
expectations about the duties and responsibilities of motherhood 
as a lever to pressure women into traditional roles of child care 
and economic dependency. They make it more difficult for 
women to aspire to opportunities in the public world of work 
that are inconsistent with being the primary caregiver of a child 
(or a number of children). They push more women into low-
status occupations and conditions of economic dependence and 
help keep them there. As a result, these laws deny women a sig-
nificant choice in the direction of their lives, as well as control 
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over their bodies. Because criminalization of abortion reinforces 
women's subordinate status in society, it denies them the equal 
citizenship guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The argument I have just presented reasons about abortion 
quite differently from the Supreme Court's sex equality juris-
prudence. That jurisprudence asks whether or not there is classi-
fication that makes distinctions based on sex and then asks 
whether the classification is closely tailored to a sufficiently im-
portant public interest, or is the relic of outmoded stereotypes 
about men and women. 79 Laws that discriminate against preg-
nant women are not even treated as sex discrimination;80 laws 
that formally distinguish between men and women but are justi-
fied on women's ability to become pregnant are generally upheld 
based on natural or biological differences between the sexes.81 
Finally, laws that impose disproportionate burdens on women 
are constitutional unless it can be demonstrated that the burdens 
were imposed because of a desire to harm women.82 Under these 
doctrines, abortion is simply not a question of sex equality; first, 
because it is directed at pregnant women; second, because even 
if it were a question of sex equality, pregnancy is a sufficient rea-
son to treat women differently from men; and third, because it is 
difficult to prove that states have criminalized abortion out of a 
secret animus toward women. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's doctrines are merely at-
tempts to instantiate and apply the Fourteenth Amendment's 
guarantees of equal citizenship; they are not the guarantees 
themselves. The fact that these doctrines fail utterly to recognize 
that abortion implicates questions of women's rights or women's 
equality is not a reason to think that abortion in unrelated to 
these concerns; rather, it is a reason to think that the existing 
doctrine underprotects the equal citizenship of women that is 
guaranteed by the constitutional text. 
My argument also differs from existing doctrinal structures 
in that it combines elements of liberty and equality: Criminaliza-
tion of abortion limits women's liberty because it denies them 
the liberty to choose whether or not to become mothers, and be-
79. United States v. Virginia. 518 U.S. 515 (1996): Craig v. Boren. 429 U.S. 190 
(1976). 
80. Geduldig v. Alleio. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Bw see Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. 
Hibbs. 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
81. Nguyen v. INS. 533 U.S. 53 (2001): Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma 
County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
82. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
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cause it requires women to adopt life-altering obligations that 
will place them in conditions of economic and social depend-
ence. It limits equality because it imposes special obligations on 
women to surrender their bodies to bear children, and because 
by withdrawing their choice whether or not to become mothers it 
helps place women in conditions of social and economic depend-
ency, which helps maintain their subordinate status as citizens. 
Thus it limits their liberty profoundly and it is also class legisla-
tion that violates the equal citizenship principle. 
This interconnection between liberty and equality is not 
surprising, because the two ideas are intertwined in the princi-
ples that underlie the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. To 
take only one example, the Privileges or Immunities Clause, as 
originally conceived, was both about liberty and equality. It did 
not treat tort, contract, and property rights as fundamental rights 
(in our modern sense) so that all state regulation of tort, contract 
and property rights would be regarded as immediately suspect. 
Rather, it allowed reasonable regulation of basic civil rights of 
tort, contract and property as long as it was within the state's po-
lice power, and not class legislation.83 
After Emancipation, Southern States passed the infamous 
Black Codes that denied blacks almost all of their civil rights and 
sought to return them to a legal state little better than slavery. 
These Black Codes were a major impetus to the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment. To use Jed 
Rubenfeld's expression, the Black Codes were the "paradigm 
83. That is why the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized the 1866 Civil 
Rights Bill. which required that blacks enjoy the same contract. tort and property rights 
as enjoyed by white citizens. See also AMAR, supra note 62. at 178-79 (suggesting a dis-
tinction between full protection for fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights and protec-
tion against unreasonable discrimination in common law rights). Some scholars have con-
tended that the Privileges or Immunities Clause is only a guarantee of equality among 
citizens. See Harrison. supra note 59, 1387-88; CURRIE. supra note 59, at 342-51. See also 
NELSON. supra note 30, at 115-18, 123 (evidence is inconclusive as to whether section 
one guaranteed substantive liberties as well as equal regulation of liberty). But I believe 
the better argument is that the Privileges or Immunities Clause also imposes substantive 
protections against state regulation; for example, the guarantees contained in the Bill of 
Rights. See, e.g .. AMAR, supra note 62, at 174-97; CURTIS. supra note 62. at 71-83: Curtis. 
Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause. supra note 50, at 56--{)5. As noted 
above. Senator Howard's statement introducing the Fourteenth Amendment in the Sen-
ate argued that protecting basic rights of citizenship- including the individual rights pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights- was in fact one of the key purposes of the clause. CONG. 
GLOBE. 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard) ("'The great object 
of the first section of this amendment is ... to restrain the power of the States and com-
pel them at all times to respect these great fundamental guarantees."). See supra text ac-
companying notes 44-59. 
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case" of class legislation.84 What made the Black Codes class leg-
islation was not simply that they restricted common law rights, 
but that they severely restricted them for blacks but not for 
whites. Denying liberty unequally is a pretty standard method of 
subordinating a group and keeping persons in that group in their 
place. 
Over the years we have erected a doctrinal structure that 
tries (unsuccessfully in many cases) to disaggregate questions of 
liberty (currently treated under the Due Process Clause and the 
fundamental rights branch of the Equal Protection Clause) from 
equality (currently treated under the suspect classification 
branch of the Equal Protection Clause). But the interconnec-
tions between liberty and equality remain. The Supreme Court's 
reformulation of Roe v. Wade in Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Case/5 is nominally concerned with a 
question of liberty-whether the state has placed an undue bur-
den on the right to abortion. But the basis of that liberty is a 
concern about equality-the equal status of women in society. 
The Court's 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas86 was also based 
on the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. But the 
Court's opinion referred to dignitary concerns that we would 
normally associate with values of equality and equal citizenship.87 
We might think of both Lawrence (decided under the Due Proc-
ess Clause) and the earlier case of Romer v. Evans88 (decided 
under the Equal Protection Clause) as concerned with whether 
the laws challenged in these cases constituted class legislation 
designed to subordinate homosexuals, keep them in their places, 
and treat them both as outlaws and as beyond the protection of 
the law. 
I have argued that laws that criminalize abortion are class 
and subordinating legislation that helps maintain second-class 
citizenship for women. But I do not argue that the mere exis-
tence of an abortion right fully secures women's equal citizen-
ship. Robin West has pointed out that if "[m]othering children, 
as we presently construct this work is incompatible with the basic 
rights and responsibilities of citizenship,"s9 then giving women a 
84. ]ED RUBENFELD. FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
SELF-GOVERNMENT (2000): lED RUBENFELD. REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY (2006). 
85. 505 u.s. 833 (1992). 
86. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
87. See id. at 567. 575-76. Justice O'Connor's concurrence is specifically based on 
the idea of equality. /d. at 579 (O"Connor.J .. concurring in the judgment). 
88. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
89. Robin West. Concurring in the Judgment. in WHAT ROE v. WADE SHOULD 
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right to choose abortions does not cure the larger structural 
problem. We cannot simply say that because a women could 
have had an abortion, she therefore has no right to complain 
about the way in which family and work structures help relegate 
women to conditions of economic and social dependency. The 
abortion right, West concludes, is at best "a pathetically inade-
quate remedy"90 for a much larger problem, and constitutionally 
conscientious legislatures should try to assist mothers, equalize 
burdens and reform the workplace to help secure women's prac-
tical equality with men. Indeed, by easing the burdens on 
women, legislatures may make abortions less frequent and pro-
tect the interests and lives of children, both before and after 
birth, more effectively. 
V. ABORTION AND THE PRIVILEGES OR 
IMMUNITIES OF NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 
A second location for the constitutional right to abortion 
might be the Privileges or Immunities Clause. As Senator How-
ard noted, that clause guarantees those "fundamental rights and 
liberties which belong to every citizen of the United States and 
to all persons who happen to be within their jurisdiction."91 The 
Congress that drafted the Fourteenth Amendment understood 
that the list of such fundamental rights "cannot be fully defined 
in their entire extent and precise nature,"92 so that it is no objec-
tion that some of them are not specifically mentioned in the 
Constitution. The language of and principles underlying the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause are a far better source of the 
right to abortion (and other fundamental rights) than the Due 
Process Clause (where courts currently locate them), and for a 
fairly simple reason: the Privileges and Immunities Clause was 
intended to serve precisely that function. Instead of asking 
whether an interest is a fundamental right or protected liberty 
under the Due Process Clause, the more natural and sensible 
question is whether it is a privilege or immunity that all citizens 
enjoy. 
The argument for a constitutional right to abortion under 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause is quite similar to the argu-
ment I have just offered under the Equal Protection Clause. 
HAVE SAID, supra note 3. at 141. 
90. /d. 
91. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Congress. 1st session. at 2766 (remarks of Sen. Howard). 
92. /d. at 2765. 
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First, women have a right to protect their bodily integrity; when 
the state bans abortion, it forces women to bear children even 
when it would endanger their life and their health. Second, 
women have a right to decide whether they wish to become par-
ents and assume the duties and responsibilities of parenthood. 
These are life-changing obligations that completely transform a 
woman's life and prospects and may commit her to years of child 
care and increased social and economic dependency. The state 
may not force individuals to assume such life-altering obligations 
against their will. When the state bans abortion, it forces women 
to become mothers-with all the attendant social expectations 
and responsibilities-or else give up sexual intercourse (because 
contraception is not always effective). Because the state may not 
force people to become parents against their will, it may not put 
women to this choice. 
The argument from the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
however is more complicated than the argument from the Equal 
Protection Clause. The Privileges or Immunities Clause is de-
claratory-its language does not specify the rights it protects but 
merely asserts their existence.93 The framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment assumed that there were rights preexisting govern-
ment that all citizens enjoyed; the job of the federal government 
and the states was to protect these rights from infringement. Un-
til the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the argument 
went, the federal government had no power to protect these 
rights from state infringement except in very limited settings.94 
After the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment the courts 
(through interpretation of section 1) and Congress (through its 
enforcement powers under section 5) would have the ability and 
the duty to do so. 
When Congress passes legislation to protect the privileges 
or immunities of national citizenship, it can announce that, in its 
93. On the declaratory ideas behind the Fourteenth Amendment and the ideas of 
declaratory theories generally, see AMAR, supra note 62. at 147-56. 
94. See CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong .. 1st session. at 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep. 
Bingham) (new Fourteenth Amendment gives federal government the power "to protect 
by national law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and the 
inborn rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the same shall be abridged 
or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State"). Bingham argued that the Amend-
ment "takes from no state any right that ever pertained to it." because "(n]o State ever 
had the right ... to deny any freeman the equal protection of the laws or to abridge the 
privileges or immunities of any citizen of the Republic. although many of them have as-
sumed and exercised that power. and that without remedy." !d. That is. Bingham's view 
was that the Fourteenth Amendment gave power to protect the rights that citizens al-
ready had. 
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view, these rights belong to all citizens. (To be sure. that is not 
how the Supreme Court currently understands the operation of 
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that is in part 
because the Court's understanding of the text and principles be-
hind the Fourteenth Amendment is not very good.t And when 
individuals or social movements interpret the Constitution in 
pressing for social change, they can make arguments that certain 
rights heretofore unrecognized or insufficiently protected are 
fundamental guarantees of citizenship that deserve special pro-
tection. When a court seeks to protect declaratory rights, how-
ever, it must do something in addition to making substantive ar-
guments for why the rights are important; it needs evidence that 
the rights in question have achieved a special status as funda-
mental. If the rights are specifically mentioned in the text, or can 
easily be implied from specific references in the text, the task is 
far easier. But if not, then courts need another way to establish 
that the rights already exist and deserve judicial protection. One 
way to do this-although not the only way-is to look at the 
kinds of rights that have historically or traditionally been pro-
tected by states. or rights that almost all of the states have rec-
ognized or protected. The idea is that when lots of different ma-
jorities agree that these rights deserve protection, they are more 
likely to be rights with special constitutional value that all gov-
ernments are supposed to protect. That is, they become the (ex-
pected) privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. 
The list of such rights might change over time as social and po-
litical movements mobilize to protect rights and convince their 
fellow citizens that these rights are indeed important, even if 
previous generations had not felt particularly endangered or up-
set by their lack of protection.% 
There is nothing particularly strange or unusual about a dy-
namic conception of declaratory rights. People press for rights 
when they begin to feel aggrieved by their absence, and their ag-
grievement does not come all at once, but is triggered by new 
problems and changed circumstances. ~7 Then people press for 
95. For a discussion based on the history surrounding the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment. see Michael W. McConnell. lnstitlltions and Interpretation: A Cri-
tique of City of Boerne v. Flores. 111 HARV. L. REV. 153. 182-83 (1997). 
96. For a discussion of how social movements draw on existing materials to fashion 
rights claims. see Jim Pope. The Role of Social Movements in Constitutional Interpreta-
tion and Enforcement (Aug. 2007) (unpublished manuscript on file with author and Con-
stitutional Commentarv). 
97. See Reva B. ·Siegel. Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social 
Movement Perspective. 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297. 340-45 (2001) (noting how suffragists re-
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protection of these rights, arguing that governments always 
should have protected them, whether or not this was in fact the 
case and whether or not the claim even made sense in an earlier 
era. Thus, a declaratory conception of rights is almost always a 
dynamic conception which uses history and tradition as a power-
ful justificatory rhetoric. Rights become fundamental and time-
less, in short, when the time is right for them. 
Under this approach, it is not difficult to understand why 
the right to use contraceptives, first recognized in Griswold v. 
Connecticur in 1965, and extended in Eisenstadt v. Baircr and 
Carey v. Population Services International,J(YJ would qualify as a 
privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States, not only 
for legislatures, but for courts as well. A social movement for 
contraceptive rights had been ongoing throughout most of the 
twentieth century, and had eventually convinced most of the 
country, as evidenced by almost universal decriminalization. By 
1965 when Griswold was decided, only one state, Connecticut, 
still outlawed the use of contraceptives, and the law was only fit-
fully enforced. 
This approach to privileges and immunities sees the scope 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as dynamic, depending on 
the emerging customs, expectations and traditions of the Ameri-
can people as a whole. The clause's "declaratory" nature invites 
individuals throughout the country to press for reforms at the 
state, local, and national levels to protect rights that they believe 
are due to them as citizens and to explain to and convince their 
fellow citizens why these rights are so important. When enough 
people around the country have been convinced, and enough le-
gal protections have spread throughout the country, federal 
courts are entitled to pronounce that these rights have become 
expected and customary rights of American citizens, and there-
fore should be binding on the small remainder of the states that 
have become outliers. Rights become privileges and immunities 
of citizenship as a result of a period of constitutional politics in 
which the people speak through protest and discussion and legal 
reform, arguing that certain rights are important basic protec-
tions of American citizenship and winning over a large number 
of people to their views. At the time the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was ratified, people understood that these rights included 
framed arguments as constitutional claims given the particular problems they faced). 
98. 381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
99. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
100. 431 u.s. 678 (1977). 
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basic access to the legal system and basic rights to make con-
tracts and own property. The recognition that all human beings 
have a right to their liberty, and to the ownership of their labor 
was the result of a long debate over human rights in the antebel-
lum period, bringing together Jacksonian, free soil, and antislav-
ery ideas among others. 101 That is why the framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment believed that the Black Codes were 
inconsistent with American citizenship. But as times change, and 
through sustained contestation by social and political move-
ments and their opponents, new privileges and immunities can 
enter the Pantheon of American citizenship. The Privileges or 
Immunities Clause protects unenumerated rights whose pedigree 
is established elsewhere in the political system-through sus-
tained argument, debate, and political activity. 
This approach to privileges and immunities of citizenship 
makes sense of much of the Court's "substantive due process" 
doctrines, which developed after the Court improperly truncated 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause. These doctrines developed 
in response to social and political demands for rights over a sus-
tained period of time that drew on existing traditions of practice, 
or that eventually convinced large numbers of people in many 
different parts of the country. As the sexual revolution pro-
ceeded, more and more people assumed that basic elements of 
sexual autonomy were guarantees of citizenship. As we have 
seen, this approach makes sense of Griswold v. Connecticut. In 
1987 Judge Robert Bork's confirmation to the Supreme Court 
failed in part because he refused to accept that the decision in 
Griswold protected a basic right of American citizens.102 By the 
time Justice Samuel Alito was confirmed to the Supreme Court 
in 2006, it was quite clear that support for Griswold was part of 
the "constitutional catechism" that all Justices had to recite in 
101. NELSON. supra note 30, at 13-40. 64-90: WILLIAM M. WIECEK. THE SOURCES 
OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 1760-1848. at 190-93. 206-07. 218-
20. 274-75 (1977); HAROLD M. HYMAN. A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE 
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION 435-36,438-40 (1973): ERIC 
FONER. FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR. FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN 
PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 73-99 (1970). See also JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL 
UNDER LAW 51-55. 66-93, 117-20 (1965): JUDITH A. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE 
CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 62-64. 77 (1983): 
CURTIS. supra note 62. at 42-56; ROBIN WEST. PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 20-30 (1994). 
102. At the very least. Bork's opponents believed that his opposition to Griswold 
helped undermine his case. See Lackland H. Bloom. Twenty Fifth Anniversary of Gris-
wold v. Connecticut and the Right to Privacy: The Legacy of Griswold. 16 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 511. 542-43 (1989). 
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order to be confirmed.101 The declaratory theory of the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause also makes sense of the Court's 2003 deci-
sion in Lawrence v. Texas.l().j By 2003, only thirteen states crimi-
nalized same-sex sodomy, and the law was almost never en-
forced in criminal prosecutions. Instead, it was used to deny 
homosexuals rights to employment, adoption, and other civil 
privileges. 105 As a result, it also acted as a contemporary form of 
class legislation that singled out a group and declared its expres-
sions of love and intimacy criminal. A sustained social move-
ment for reform changed public attitudes and made heterosexu-
als recognize that homosexuals were individuals who were 
equally citizens and therefore deserved the same rights of sexual 
intimacy that they had long enjoyed. This changed the social 
meaning of sodomy laws and hence their constitutional meaning 
with respect to the principles underlying the text of the Four-
teenth Amendment. This analysis also shows why the issue pre-
sented in Lawrence presented a more difficult case for courts in 
1986 when Bowers v. Hardwick 10" was decided. In 1986, only half 
of the country had abolished its same-sex sodomy laws, although 
the trend was toward decriminalization. 107 
Abortion rights, however, present a more complicated story. 
The Supreme Court decided Roe before most states had recog-
nized abortion rights. In 1960, all states criminalized abortion 
with very few exceptions. In the next decade, however, in part 
because of the sexual revolution and the second wave of Ameri-
can feminism, attitudes toward abortion changed dramatically, 
and by 1972 a significant majority of Americans-including 
American Catholics- believed that the question of abortion 
should be left to the woman and her doctor. Hli' At the same time 
a wide range of prominent organizations-ranging from the 
AMA to the YMCA to the ABA to a Presidential Commis-
sion-called for reform of the nation's abortion laws. 10'1 Never-
theless, by January 1973, when Roe was decided, only thirteen 
103. Jack M. Balkin. The Constitutional Catechism. Balkinization. http://balkin. 
logspot.com/2006/ 01/constitutional-catechism.html (Last visited June 26. 2006). 
104. 539 u.s. 558 (2003). 
105. See id. at 572. 
106. 478 u.s. 186 (1986). 
107. See Lawrence. 539 U.S. at 572. 
108. See DAVID J. GARROW. LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 539 (1994) (noting a January 1972 Gallup poll stat-
ing that fifty seven percent of Americans. and fifty four percent of American Catholics. 
agreed that the abortion decision should be left to a woman and her doctor). 
109. GERALD ROSENBERG. THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? 184 (1991). 
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states had passed abortion reform statutes, which gave doctors 
more leeway to perform abortions in cases where life or health 
was threatened, and only four states had passed abortion repeal 
statutes that left the decision up to the woman and her doctor in 
the first half of pregnancy. 110 State laws on the books had not 
caught up with the direction of public opinion. Thus, when Roe 
was decided, the Court imposed constitutional rules that had 
been adopted by only four states out of fifty. In 1973, when Roe 
was decided, the right to abortion was not a privilege or immu-
nity of national citizenship, at least under the declaratory theory. 
It is possible that a wave of abortion repeal statutes might 
have swept the country in the 1970's, but we will never know be-
cause the Supreme Court interrupted the trend. Both David 
Garrow and Gene Burns have argued, to the contrary, that the 
pro-life movement was rapidly gathering steam even before Roe 
and might have stopped or at least greatl~ slowed the pro-choice 
movement's advance in state legislatures. 11 
When the Court decided Roe in 1973. the right to abortion 
had not yet gained the status of a privilege or immunity of na-
tional citizenship, at least as judged by the pace of abortion re-
form legislation. A different question is whether it has become 
one in the past thirty years. If Roe v. Wade were overruled to-
day. it is likely that an overwhelming majority of the states 
would protect some kind of right to abortion-perhaBs less than 
twelve would outlaw abortion in virtually every case. 1 2 And pub-
lic opinion polls regularly show strong public resistance to over-
turning Roe v. Wade. 113 That suggests that most of the public now 
110. /d. at 184. Rachel Benson Gold. Lessons From Before Roe: Will Past Be Pro-
logue?. THE GCTTMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY. Mar. 2003. at 8. available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/06/1/gr060108.html. 
111. GE~E BL'R~S. THE MORAL VETO: FRAMING CONTRACEPTION. ABORTION 
A~D CCLTURAL PLURALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 214-228 (2005) (shift from medical 
frame to moral frame. exacerbated by associations between abortion and the feminist 
movement. limited the success of abortion repeal statutes by the early 1970s): David 
Garrow. Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: An Historical Perspective. 62 ALB. L. 
REV. 833.840-41 (1999) (arguing that the 1970 New York liberalization law. and not Roe 
v. Wade. energized the right-to-life movement). 
112. Both pro-life and pro-choice groups. for different reasons. have incentives to 
maximize the number. Shortly before the 2004 elections. the Center for Reproductive 
Rights estimated that 21 states might outlaw abortion if Roe v. Wade were overturned. 
ERICA SMOCK. CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS. WHAT IF ROE FELL? (2004), 
http://www .crlp.orgipdflbo _ whatifroe fe II. pdf. 
113. In a CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll. taken from Jan. 20-22. 2006, 66 percent of 
the public opposed overturning Roe v. Wade. up from 63 percent in a poll taken from 
Julv 7-10. 2005. See PollingReport.com: An independent. nonpartisan resource on trends 
in American public opinion. http://www.pollingreport.com/abortion.htm (last visited June 
19.2006). 
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regards a basic abortion right as among the guarantees of citi-
zenship. But if so, critics might respond, it is in part because of 
the Court's bootstrapping, making the right to abortion the legal 
status quo and thereby acclimating the country to it. We cannot 
be sure how much of current public acceptance of abortion rights 
is due to the Court's early decision and how much is due to the 
success of social movement activism that changed the minds of 
most Americans throughout the country. 
One might respond, however, that in the case of a contro-
versial opinion like Roe, this ''bootstrapping" effect is greatly 
exaggerated. Political scientists have long pointed out that the 
Court does not oppose popular majorities over a sustained pe-
riod, particularly on controversial subjects like abortion. 114 De-
spite over thirty years of pro-life mobilization, the political 
dominance of the Republicans as a pro-life party, the election of 
several pro-life presidents, and decades of Republican judicial 
appointments, the basic right to abortion is still standing. Instead 
of being completely overturned, the original Roe decision was 
cut back in the Casey compromise, a compromise which, not at 
all coincidentally, also better reflected public opinion. 
Although one might argue that the decision in Roe unfairly 
helped foster public support for abortion rights, it is equally pos-
sible, perhaps even likely, that the Court's early decision actually 
hardened and increased public opposition to abortion. The 
Court's decision in Roe galvanized an already emerging right-to-
life movement and gave it a highly visible target for populist re-
action. Political entrepreneurs saw that they could form new coa-
litions of groups previously at odds organized around a common 
opposition to abortion rights. 115 If the Court had proceeded more 
slowly, and articulated the scope of the right only over many 
114. The canonical statement is Robert A. Dahl. Decision-Making in a Democracy: 
The Supreme Court as a Na1ional Policy-Maker. 6 1. PUB. L. 279. 285 (1957). who noted 
that "the policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the pol-
icy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States." id. For later 
versions. see Balkin & Levinson. supra note 26. at 1060. TERI JENNINGS PEREITI. IN 
DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 80-132 (1999). Mark Graber's gloss on Dahl suggests 
that abortion may be an issue where many politicians are more than willing to blame the 
Court and make it take the political heat in order to preserve majority status. See Mark 
A. Graber. The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary. 7 
STUD. AM. POL. DEY. 35. 36 (1993) ("[J]ustices ... declare state and federal practices 
unconstitutional only when the dominant national coalition is unable or unwilling to set-
tle some public dispute ... [and] prominent elected officials consciously invite the judici-
ary to resolve those political controversies that they cannot or would not address."). 
115. Robert C. Post and Reva Siegel. Roe Rage: Democratic Constitwionalism and 
Backlash. 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007). 
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years, it would not necessarily have forestalled the growth of a 
powerful pro-life movement, but it might have helped produce a 
political compromise that better meshed with developing trends 
in public opinion. Possibly the Court's early intervention caused 
both types of effects with respect to different parts of the popu-
lation. Some people came to accept abortion rights because the 
Court protected them, while others came to oppose them for the 
very same reason. 
In sum, even if the right to abortion was not a privilege or 
immunity of citizenship in 1973, we can make a far stronger case 
for it thirty years later. First, there is a strong substantive argu-
ment for why abortion rights are basic rights of citizenship, 
which shares much in common with the argument under the 
Equal Protection Clause. Second, there is also a very strong case 
that contraceptive rights are protected under the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause. Finally, there is the public's stated desire not 
to have Roe overturned. Together, these elements help make the 
case for protecting abortion rights today under the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause. That is not a necessary conclusion-abortion 
rights are already guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause-
but this interpretation would harmonize ideas behind the two 
clauses. If criminalizing abortion prevents women from enjoying 
full and equal citizenship, then it would seem to follow that a 
right to abortion is necessary (albeit not sufficient) for women to 
enjoy equal citizenship. But if a right is necessary to enjoy equal 
citizenship, then it must be a basic right of citizenship and so, in 
the long run at least, it should eventually be protected under the 
declaratory model of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
VI. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE UNBORN 
The case for a right to abortion is hardly complete. We must 
still consider whether the unborn have their own constitutional 
rights that trump those of the mother. Are the unborn, through-
out their development, from fertilized ovum to unimplanted 
blastocyst to embryo to fetus, persons within the meaning of the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses? As Justice Black-
mun pointed out in Roe itself, if the unborn are constitutional 
persons, the argument for a constitutional right to abortion col-
lapses.116 Indeed, as I shall point out in a moment, states might be 
116. Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113.156 (1973). 
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constitutionally prohibited from permitting abortions under the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 
None of the Justices in Roe v. Wade-whether in the major-
ity or the dissent-maintained that the unborn are constitutional 
persons. 117 In fact, none of the Justices in all of the abortion cases 
since Roe v. Wade-no matter how opposed to recognizing a 
constitutional right to abortion- has ever contested Roe's hold-
ing about the personhood of the unborn. 11R 
The word "person" means now what it meant in 1868-an 
individual human being.119 A fertilized ovum has human DNA 
and, if it implants and is not miscarried, will eventually grow into 
a human being who is an individual. But the fertilized ovum is 
not yet an individual. Although the text of the Constitution re-
fers to the word "person" at several points, by and large these 
references do not make sense when applied to fertilized ova, 
blastocysts, embryos or fetuses. For example, immediately be-
fore the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Constitu-
tion states that "[n)o person ... shall be compelled in any crimi-
nal case to be a witness against himself." 120 It is hard to see how a 
fetus could be compelled to testify against anyone, much less 
against itself. 
117. See id. at 177 (Rehnquist. J .. dissenting) ("The only conclusion possible from 
this history is that the drafters did not intend to have the Fourteenth Amendment with-
draw from the States the power to legislate with respect to this matter."): see also Doe v. 
Bolton. 410 U.S. 179, 222 (White. J.. dissenting) ("This issue, for the most part. should be 
left with the people and to the political processes the people have devised to govern their 
affairs."). 
118. Instead they have argued that the issue of abortion should be left to the political 
process. a position that is inconsistent with constitutional personhood for the unborn and 
with a constitutional right to abortion. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania v. Casey. 505 U.S. 833. 979 (1992) (Scalia. J .. dissenting. joined by Rehnquist, C.J.. 
and White and Thomas. JJ.) ("The States may. if they wish. permit abortion on demand. 
but the Constitution does not require them to do so. The permissibility of abortion. and 
the limitations upon it. are to be resolved like most important questions in our democ-
racy: by citizens trying to persuade one another and then voting."): id. at 982 (''The 
whole argument of abortion opponents is that what the Court calls the fetus and what 
others call the unborn child is a human life .... There is. of course. no way to determine 
that as a legal matter; it is. in fact. a value judgment."). 
119. 11 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 597 (2d. ed. 1989) ("An individual human 
being: a man woman or child. (In earliest use. the human being acting in some capacity. 
personal agent or actor. person concerned.)''); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1686 {1993) ("'an individual 
human being."). 
There is also a specifically legal definition of "person" which. in this context. is al-
most perfectly circular: "A human being (actual person) or body corporate (artificial per-
son) having rights and duties recognized by law." 11 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY at 
597. The question in this case. of course. is whether the embrvo or fetus has constitu-
tional rights recognized at law. -
120. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
338 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:291 
Nor does the text of the Fourteenth Amendment compel 
the view that embryos or fetuses are persons. The first clause 
says that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside." Does this mean that 
there are "persons" who are not born and who are therefore not 
eligible to be citizens? Or, more plausibly, does the amendment 
simply assume that all persons are born somewhere, and that 
those born in the United States (or who are subsequently natu-
ralized) are citizens? Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
written at the same time as Section 1, says that "Representatives 
shall be apportioned among the several States according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in 
each State, excluding Indians not taxed." 121 This language does 
not suggest that embryos and fetuses would count for purposes 
of enumeration.122 As discussed above, the key principle underly-
ing the text of Fourteenth Amendment is the principle of civil 
equality-all persons are equal under the law-born equal, we 
might say-and therefore enjoy basic rights accorded to all free 
persons. Hence the state may not discriminate against them due 
the circumstances of their birth, for example, that they were 
born black or white, male or female, rich or poor. Important as 
this principle is, it says nothing about the unborn. 123 
The original expected application of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is not by itself controlling; it is merely evidence of 
how to apply original meaning. But it also points against recog-
nizing fetuses as persons. The common law distinguished be-
tween abortions before and after quickening- the point when a 
fetus's movements could be felt by a pregnant woman, usually 
between the fourth and fifth month. Abortion was a felony after 
121. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.§ 2. 
122. Justice Blackmun added in Roe that "[w)e are not aware that in the taking of 
any census under [the Apportionment Clause of Article I. Section 2]. a fetus has ever 
been counted." 410 U.S. at 157 n.53. 
123. The argument is not by itself conclusive. Corporations are persons under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. but they are not counted for purposes of the census. See Akhil 
Reed Amar. /ntratextualism. 112 HARV. L. REV. 747. 775 (1999). What reinforces the 
textual argument made above are the legal consequences of holding that fertilized ova. 
embryos. blastocysts and fetuses have the same rights as born persons. As discussed infra. 
this would mean that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses should apply with 
equal force. The alternative and. I think. better view is that although the unborn are not 
themselves constitutional persons. the state has important interests in their potential to 
become persons. as well as interests in the value of life in general; under this interpreta-
tion states could treat the unborn differently than born persons without running afoul of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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quickening, but not before. 124 This distinction would make little 
sense if the unborn were persons from the moment of concep-
tion; there is no good justification for imposing lesser penalties 
(or no penalties at all) for ending the life of human beings too 
young to kick. Around the time of the Civil War, many states 
were in the process of changing their abortion laws to criminalize 
abortions thro~¥hout the p~egnancy_, and by 1868 most states 
had such laws.· But there IS no evidence that the framers or 
adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to enact a prin-
ciple that would alter common law views about the unborn. 
Moreover, some of the abortion statutes passed during this pe-
riod-like the Texas statute at issue in Roe v. Wade, enacted in 
185412" -criminalized abortions performed on women but did not 
punish women who self-aborted. This treatment of the unborn, 
too, would make little sense if the unborn were regarded as per-
sons. (It would, however, make some sense if the point of abor-
tion laws was to protect women from botched abortions by in-
competent doctors). 
Finally, arguments from consequences support the argu-
ments from text and history. If the unborn are persons, they are 
entitled to equal protection of the laws. Abortion then becomes 
the premeditated killing of a person. This would not leave abor-
tion regulation to individual states, as some critics of Roe have 
advocated. Rather, it would prohibit virtually all abortions ex-
cept those necessary to save the mother's life.127 States would 
have to treat abortions the same way they treat other premedi-
tated killings. At least where death or serious bodily harm to the 
mother is not at risk, there is a fairly strong argument that crimi-
nal laws that criminalize ending the life of born persons- but not 
124. See Roe. 410 U.S. at 132-36 and sources cited at nn. 20--28. 
125. Roe. 410 U.S. at 175 (Rehnquist. J.. dissenting). 
126. Texas Laws 1854. c. 49 § 1. set forth in 3 Gammel. Laws of Texas. 1502 (1898). 
The statute was modified into what is essentially the present statute in 1857. See Texas 
Penal Code of 1857. Arts. 531-536: Paschal's Laws of Texas. Arts. 2192-97 (1866); Texas 
Rev. Stat. Arts. 536-41 (1879): Texas Rev. Crim. Stat.. Arts. 1071-76 (1911). 
127. The issue is even more complicated than this. States can certainly allow for self-
defense. even against so-called "innocent attackers" who don't realize the threat they 
pose to others. But criminal law usually requires a reasonable belief in imminent death or 
serious bodily harm before a person may use deadly force. Applying the imminence 
standard in the case of abortion might mean waiting until it was absolutely necessary to 
perform the procedure. when the fetus was well along in its development. As a result. 
doctors might be tempted to exaggerate the imminence requirement in order to permit 
the abortion earlier. But if so. procedural due process should require that the embryo or 
fetus be entitled to a judicial hearing represented by counsel for the fetus before abor-
tions to save the mother's life would be permitted. 
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"persons" in utero-would violate "equal protection of the laws" 
in the most literal sense. 
Some states in the pre-Roe era (like Georgia, which adopted 
the Model Penal Code) allowed abortions in cases of rape or in-
cest. But if the unborn are persons under the meaning of the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, it would be very diffi-
cult to justify exempting a person's murder from criminal punish-
ment merely because the victim's life arose out of coerced sex or 
an incestuous union. Even before Roe states generally did not 
punish abortion as severely as they did murder, some did not pun-
ish abortion at all before a certain point in the pregnancy, and 
some, like Texas, did not punish the mother but only the doctor 
who performed the abortion. All these laws would be constitu-
tionally suspect if the unborn are persons guaranteed the equal 
protection of the laws. It might also become difficult to explain 
why fertility clinics could discard unused embryos left over from 
in vitro fertilization processes, even with the biological parents' 
permission. Normally, parents who order their born children be 
destroyed by third parties can be prosecuted for murder. 
The Constitution does not require that all murder be treated 
the same. States can punish negligent homicide and murder com-
mitted in the heat of passion less severely than other forms of 
murder. But abortion involves a premeditated act with the specific 
intent of ending the life of the embryo or fetus. Premeditated 
homicide is the most severely punished in virtually all jurisdic-
tions. To be sure, some people do believe that abortion is nothing 
more than cold-blooded murder. But most Americans-even 
those with moral qualms about abortion-do not agree. For ex-
ample, they may want to punish the doctor but not the mother, 
even though it is the mother who seeks and pays for the abortion. 
That is a very different attitude from the one they would have to-
ward a person who pays for a contract killer. They think there is a 
difference-in terms of who should be punished and what the 
punishment should be-between a woman who has a first-term 
abortion and a person who commits first-degree murder. We 
should not interpret the Constitution to forbid that distinction. 
VII. THE TWO RIGHTS TO ABORTION 
Nothing I have said so far tells us how the right to abortion 
should be enforced, or how courts should accommodate the 
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state's interests in protecting potential human life. 128 If there is a 
constitutional right to abortion, it hardly follows that it can be 
exercised with equal freedom at any point in the pregnancy. 
Courts must create judicial constructions if they want to imple-
ment the constitutional right. Reasonable people can disagree 
about the best way to do this. The Supreme Court's original at-
tempt in Roe-the trimester system-drew considerable criti-
cism for being legislative and ad hoc. In this section I try to offer 
an alterative approach that is more closely connected to the rea-
sons why the right to abortion deserves constitutional protection. 
I believe that my approach would have been better if adopted 
initially. However, the Court's decision in Casey, which rejected 
the trimester system, moved the doctrine toward an alternative 
construction that, while imperfect, is more acceptable. 
When the Court first announced the right to abortion in Roe 
v. Wade/ 29 it offered a fairly complicated trimester formula: In 
the first trimester, "the abortion decision and its effectuation 
must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's 
attending physician."00 In the second trimester, "the State ... 
may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that 
are reasonably related to maternal health."m The second trimes-
ter, the Court explained, ended roughly at the point of viability, 
the point at which the fetus is "potentially able to live outside 
the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid. "132 After viability, 
and throughout the third trimester, the State's interest in poten-
tial human life becomes sufficiently compelling that "the 
State ... may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abor-
128. In his response to this article. Mitch Berman points out that even if the right to 
abortion is consistent with the Constitution's original meaning. and even if the unborn 
are not persons with their own independent constitutional rights. states might still legally 
prohibit abortions (except perhaps those necessary to save a woman's life) if they could 
show that (1) protection of unborn life is a compelling state interest from the moment of 
conception and (2) preventing all abortions is narrowly tailored to vindicate that interest. 
Mitchell N. Berman. Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus A Thought Or Two About 
Abortion). 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383 (2007). I have tried to demonstrate why states can-
not successfully make this showing in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra 
note 3. at 47-52. and I offer another version of the argument in Balkin, supra note 4. at 
522-27. My goal here is more modest: to show that the constitutional right to abortion is 
consistent with the Constitution's original meaning. The argument that follows assumes 
that although states cannot ban all abortions. they nevertheless have important interests 
in unborn life that would justify banning at least some abortions. 
129. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
130. 410 U.S. at 164. 
131. /d. 
132. /d. at 160. 
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tion except where it i~ necessary.' in appropriate medical ju~¥­
ment, for the preservatiOn of the hfe or health of the mother."· 
The joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Case/ 34 jettisoned Roe's trimester system, and 
substituted its own doctrinal framework, now dividing the term of 
pregnancy into two parts: Before viability states could adopt 
measures designed "to persuade the woman to choose childbirth 
over abortion," or to promote maternal health, as long as they did 
not impose an "undue burden" on the woman's ability to obtain 
an abortion. After viability, states could "regulate, and even pro-
scribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medi-
cal judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the 
mother." 135 
Note that in both Roe and Casey, viability marks the 
boundary between the time before which states may regulate 
abortion only in limited ways and the time after which they may 
almost completely prohibit it. Nevertheless, in both Roe and Ca-
sey the Court insisted that states must allow abortions after vi-
ability when they are necessary to preserve the mother's life or 
health. Although the Court did not say this directly, it follows 
that abortions must also be available before viability when nec-
essary to preserve the mother's life or health. 
More than a few critics have suggested that the complex for-
mulas in Roe and Casey would have been more appropriate com-
ing from legislatures than courts. One reason for that complexity 
is that the Court views the question in terms of time. In doing so, 
it conflates two different rights to abortion that women might ex-
ercise for different reasons. This becomes clear if we break the 
Roe and Casey formulas down into their component parts, and fo-
cus not on the time during the pregnancy when the state may 
regulate in various ways, but on the reasons why a pregnant 
woman seeks the abortion. Sometimes women seek abortions to 
avoid a risk to their life or health. Sometimes they seek abortions 
because they do not want to become the mother of a new child. 
And, of course, sometimes they do so for both reasons. 
To understand how courts should enforce the right to abor-
tion, we should recognize that it is actually two rights. The first is 
a woman's right not to be forced by the state to bear children at 
risk to her life or health. The second is a woman's right to decide 
133. ld. at 165. 
134. 505 u.s. 833 (1992). 
135. 505 U.S. at 879. 
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whether or not to become a mother and assume the obligations 
of parenthood. When a woman becomes pregnant, the first right 
is the right to protect her bodily integrity- her life and her 
health. The second right is a right against state-enforced compul-
sory motherhood; it is the right of a woman- as opposed to the 
state- to decide whether she will take on the life-altering set of 
responsibilities that come with being a parent. These two rights 
derive from the constitutional arguments for why criminalization 
of abortion is class and caste legislation. 116 
The first right to abortion is not time-limited- it continues 
throughout pregnancy. Women should always have the right to 
preserve their life or health when it is threatened by the con-
tinuation of a pregnancy. The second right, however, need not 
continue throughout pregnancy; it requires only that women 
have a reasonable time to decide whether to become mothers 
and have a fair and realistic opportunity to make that choice. 
The state's interest in protecting unborn life is at its strongest in 
the later stages of pregnancy. But letting states vindicate this in-
terest when it is strongest is not necessarily inconsistent with the 
second right to abortion. When a woman's health and life are not 
at risk, the second right requires that women have a right to a 
fair and realistic opportunity to choose whether or not to be-
come a mother, and in most cases this choice can usually be 
made in the earlier stages of a pregnancy. In fact, about 88 per-
cent of all abortions occur in the first twelve weeks of pregnancy 
(roughly the end of the first trimester). Only 7 percent occur be-
tween weeks thirteen and fifteen, and only 4 percent occur be-
tween weeks sixteen and twenty. Twenty weeks is about halfway 
through the average pregnancy. Only 1 percent of abortions oc-
cur after that point, and only a vanishingly small number of 
abortions occur past twenty four weeks, the point of viability.m 
Separating out these two rights also makes clear that courts 
face different problems in articulating and protecting them. Imple-
136. See Jack M. Balkin ... Judgment of the Court."' in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD 
HAVE SAID. supra note 3. at 41. 45 (arguing for two different rights to abortion). Re-
cently Eugene Volokh has offered an interesting libertarian take on the two rights. 
Eugene Volokh. Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment 
for Organs. 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813. 1824 (2007). He believes Roe and Casey support a 
more general right of individuals to engage in medical procedures necessary to protect 
their lives. /d. at 1824-28. This right of medical self-defense is both broader and narrower 
than what I call the first right to abortion. It is narrower because it focuses on protection 
of hfe and not merely health. The right of medical self-defense is broader because it is 
not specifically connected to reproductive rights, or. for that matter. to gender equality. 
137. THE GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE. FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTION IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2006). www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.html. 
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menting the first right does not require courts to draw lines based 
on the progress of the pregnancy; rather it primarily concerns how 
much discretion legislatures must give doctors in determining 
whether a woman faces a genuine risk to her life or health that jus-
tifies exercising the first right. In Roe and Casey the Court held that 
the test was one of "appropriate medical judgment. "138 
The second right gives women a reasonable time to decide 
and a fair and realistic opportunity to choose whether to become 
mothers; it has proved more difficult for courts because the right 
need not continue throughout pregnancy, but will give way at 
some point to the state's increasingly powerful interest in pro-
tecting potential human life. What constitutes a reasonable time 
and a fair and realistic opportunity to choose combines a number 
of different factors. As noted above, it is surely concerned with 
the relative developmental state of the fetus. But equally impor-
tant, it is concerned with the question of what it is reasonable to 
expect of women who are forced to make one of the most diffi-
cult and heart-rending choices in their lives. A reasonable time 
to decide requires that a woman has enough time to discover 
that she is pregnant, talk to people she trusts, decide what to do, 
locate a physician, arrange a time to visit the physician (which 
may require taking time off from work and arranging child care 
for other children), make excuses or dissemble to family, friends 
and employers to explain her absence, travel for the initial con-
sultation, and then make another set of arrangements to go back 
for the procedure if necessary. 
The amount of time necessary may take longer for poor 
women, women in rural areas, or women in states that impose a 
series of procedural obstacles that effectively limit the number 
abortion providers in the state or that impose waiting periods. 
One might expect that states would prefer that women who 
choose to have abortions carry them out as early in the pregnancy 
as possible. However, abortion regulations like waiting periods 
may require multiple trips to the doctor and perversely increase 
the amount of time it takes to make the decision and carry it out, 
thus causing women to seek abortions later in the pregnancy. 139 
138. Roe. 410 U.S. at 164-165: Casey. 505 U.S. at 879. 
139. The practical effect of post-Casey abortion regulations has been to protect the 
right of affluent and well-connected women to choose abortions. while allowing states to 
limit the effective rights of poor women. younger women. and women in rural areas be-
cause they are easiest to deter. See MELODY ROSE. SAFE. LEGAL AND UNAVAILABLE: 
ABORTION POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 102-20 (2007). In effect. Casey has given 
states far more leeway to compel motherhood on the poor than on the rich. This is per-
verse given the purposes of the second right to abortion. Precisely because these women 
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Minor women might need a longer time to decide, because 
they may be unable or unwilling to accept the fact of their preg-
nancy, because they may need guidance from parents and other 
adults in their lives, or because, in particularly unfortunate cir-
cumstances, they may need time to approach a court for a judi-
cial bypass. In addition, some severe birth defects may only be 
discoverable later in the pregnancy. 
In Roe and Casey, the Court chose the point of viability as 
the period at which the second right to abortion ends. That line 
is somewhat arbitrary; Justice Blackmun's original idea in Roe 
was to draw the line at the end of the first trimester, but other 
Justices pointed out that this would not give some women-
particularly poor women- sufficient time to decide, and so 
Blackmun eventually settled upon the end of the second trimes-
ter.140 But even this factor is arbitrary and subject to changes in 
medical technology. In Casey, the Court noted that by 1992, de-
velopments in neonatal care had pushed the average point of vi-
ability back from 28 weeks in 1973 to 23 or 24 weeks.1 
Despite these objections, the Court in Casey retained the 
viability rule first announced in Roe, arguing that "there is no 
line other than viability which is more workable. "142 It offered 
two substantive justifications for its choice: First, "viability ... is 
the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining 
and nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent 
existence of the second life can, in reason and all fairness, be the 
object of state protection that now overrides the rights of the 
woman."
143 Second, drawing the line at viability "has, as a practi-
cal matter, an element of fairness. In some broad sense, it might 
be said that a woman who fails to act before viability has con-
sented to the State's intervention on behalf of the developing 
child." 144 These arguments suggest that the Court thought it was 
making its own independent determination of what constituted a 
reasonable time for women to decide. 
Perhaps the Court was ultimately correct that a uniform line 
should be drawn at viability, regardless of the age or poverty of 
have fewer resources, the burdens of compelled motherhood-and the derailing of lives 
that comes with it-may be far more significant for them. Casey's "undue burden" test is 
flawed to the extent that it protects the second right to abortion for only a segment of 
American women. 
140. GARROW, supra note 108, at 580-85. 
141. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860. 
142. /d. at 870. 
143. /d. 
144. /d. 
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pregnant women or the different circumstances that different 
women face. But it does not follow that the Court should have 
drawn the line, at least in the first instance. The issue of what is a 
reasonable time to decide combines a number of different fac-
tors and is inherently legislative. For example, legislatures might 
decide to extend the time for women in special circumstances in 
ways that would be inappropriate for courts. Instead of drawing 
its own line, the Court should have simply announced that 
women had certain basic rights- a right to preserve life and 
health and a right to a reasonable time to decide whether to be-
come a parent, and then leave it to legislatures to balance the 
various considerations of fetal development, women's practical 
abilities, and the different obstacles faced by different women in 
different situations. 
That would not mean that courts would have nothing to say 
on the matter. They would eventually decide whether state legis-
latures had met their constitutional obligations. The first right is 
relatively straightforward: legislatures would have to allow for 
abortions whenever life or health was threatened. The purpose 
of the second right is to give pregnant women a fair and realistic 
opportunity to decide whether or not to become mothers. Hence 
legislatures rewriting their abortion laws would have to demon-
strate that their statutory scheme had provided such a fair and 
realistic opportunity. 
The approach I advocate is discourse shaping- it demands 
that the arguments and justifications a legislature offers to sup-
port a law's constitutionality respond to particular constitutional 
goals and concerns that a court identifies. In this case, it requires 
legislatures to justify their abortion regulations in terms of how 
they affect women's practical equality in civil society and their 
practical ability to choose whether to become mothers, rather 
than solely in terms of the developmental stage of the fetus. If 
courts merely struck down existing abortion laws and demanded 
that legislatures passed new ones, legislatures might make their 
decisions based on pictures of fetuses. But if courts tell legisla-
tures that they must justify the lines they draw based on whether 
they provide women a reasonable opportunity to decide whether 
to become mothers, they will have to organize their discussions 
and their justifications around the choices and obstacles that real 
women face. Courts would then decide whether those justifica-
tions were sound according to the basic constitutional principles 
they laid out in their original opinion. 
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There is a rough analogy between my "discourse shaping" 
approach and the Vermont Supreme Court's 1999 decision in 
Baker v. State, 145 which held that the Vermont Legislature had a 
"constitutional mandate" under the state's constitution to find a 
way to give same-sex couples the "same benefits and protections 
afforded by Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples." 146 
The Baker court explained the constitutional principles that the 
legislature had to comply with, but it left appropriate enforce-
ment of those constitutional principles to the legislature in the 
first instance, noting that the legislature could extend marriage 
rights to same-sex couples or create a form of "domestic partner-
ship" with similar rights and benefits. In response, the legislature 
created the nation's first civil unions law. By inviting legislative 
participation and innovation in enforcing constitutional guaran-
tees, the Vermont Supreme Court diffused much of the political 
backlash that might have flowed from its groundbreaking and 
controversial decision. By contrast, when the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court held that gays were entitled to marry in 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Hea/th/ 47 it refused to give 
the state legislature any leeway in enforcement. 14s Although the 
Massachusetts Legislature ultimately complied with the court's 
decision, the Goodridge case quickly became identified-far 
more than the Baker decision in Vermont-with courts imposing 
controversial solutions on majorities. Thus, it may have created a 
far more powerful backlash. 
My discourse shaping approach makes even fewer demands 
on the legislature than the Baker court, because it does not spec-
ify when the cutoff point for abortions must take place. It merely 
requires that legislatures make findings about what period of 
time is sufficient to give pregnant women a fair and realistic 
chance to end their pregnancies. It brings the legislature into the 
process of articulating constitutional guarantees and therefore 
gives them a sense of democratic responsibility and ownership 
for the result. 
This approach is not "minimalist" in Cass Sunstein's sense 
of the word. Sunstein has argued that courts should rule nar-
145. 744 A.2d 864 (1999). 
146. /d. at 886. The New Jersey Supreme Court recently adopted a similar solution. 
Lewis v. Harris. 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) (giving legislature 180 davs to amend the mar-
riage statutes or enact a statutory structure that afforded committed same-sex couples 
the same rights of married couples.). On December 21. 2006. the New Jersey state legisla-
ture responded by passing a civil union act. New Jersev Public Law 2006. c.103. 
147. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
148. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate. 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004). 
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rawly on constitutional questions wherever possible and they 
should be reluctant to give controversial substantive reasons for 
their decisions, hoping instead to ground doctrine on reasons 
that most people can agree to. 149 Sunstein believes that by pro-
ceeding in this manner courts can make modest progress in pro-
moting constitutional values and catalyze legislative protection 
of constitutional rights without generating a counterproductive 
political reaction.150 
I agree that these are worthy goals but doubt that minimal-
ism is always the best method. Judges do not have to write 
minimalist opinions to respect democratic processes or to avoid 
a backlash. To the contrary, giving a legislature guidance about 
what constitutional principles are at stake may be a better way of 
facilitating a legislative solution that is both constitutionally and 
democratically acceptable. If the court says nothing, or very lit-
tle, about what principles guide its decision, and simply throws 
the issue back to legislatures without explanation, legislatures 
may respond with solutions that courts must repeatedly strike 
down, and that experience may well exacerbate political tensions 
and lead to backlash effects. Instead of hiding the ball in a mini-
malist decision, courts should explain why the constitutional 
rights they seek to protect are important, and what they will be 
looking for when they review the legislature's work. 
Under my approach, the Court would have done something 
closer to what it did in the death penalty cases, which were de-
cided around the same time.151 It would strike down old abortion 
laws and require the states to create new ones guaranteeing the 
two rights to abortion. Although the right to life movement was 
gathering steam well before Roe,152 there was still strong senti-
ment for abortion reform throughout the country. In the political 
149. CASS R. SUNSTEIN. ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MJNIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT (1996). 
150. /d. at 59 (Judicial intervention in highly controversial cases "may produce an 
intense social backlash. in the process delegitimating itself as well as the goal it seeks to 
promote."). 
151. In Furman v. Georgia. 408 U.S. 238. 239-240 (1972), the Supreme Court struck 
down the nation's death penalty laws because they were so arbitrary as to violate the 
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against Cruel and Unusual Punishments. The Court 
detailed what made the implementation of the death penalty constitutionally infirm. and 
then waited for states to pass new laws. Then in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
the Court began a long process of selectively upholding and striking down various death 
penalty laws and procedures, moving in rough coordination with the public's changing 
views about the death penalty. Although the Court has hardly escaped cntictsm for tts 
death penalty jurisprudence. it has not generated the same degree of backlash as the 
Court's abortion decisions. 
152. BURNS. supra note 11 L Garrow, supra note 111. 
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climate of the early 1970's, most states would probably have 
guaranteed a basic right to abortion perhaps averaging around 
twenty weeks, halfway through the term of a normal pregnancy, 
along with a host of various regulations and exceptions. For ex-
ample, in February 1972, almost a year before Roe was decided, 
the American Bar Association had advocated repeal of abortion 
laws up to the first twenty weeks, midway between the end of 
the first and second trimesters. 1' 3 We should not overestimate the 
degree of liberalization that the 1970's would have produced 
without Roe, particularly as the right-to-life movement energized 
and abortion rights became increasingly identified with feminism 
and the ERA. New abortion laws would probably not have given 
women guarantees as extensive as those which originally ap-
peared in Roe and Doe v. Bolton. 1' 4 
After many states passed new abortion laws and created 
legislative records justifying them, the Supreme Court would be 
able to evaluate legislative decisions and fix upon a minimum set 
of standards for outlier jurisdictions. Because it would be review-
ing comprehensive schemes that legislatures themselves had de-
vised, the Court would be exercising less of a traditionally legis-
lative and more of a traditionally judicial role. The legislative 
decisions would also possess a greater democratic legitimacy 
than a one-size-fits-all requirement imposed by a court. This 
would not end all controversies over abortion, but it would have 
given the abortion right a firmer, more democratic grounding 
than the actual decision in Roe did. 
To be sure, a small number of states would have insisted on 
virtually no abortion rights, or would have made spurious de-
terminations that a very short time-say three weeks-was all 
the time that women needed to decide. However, precisely be-
cause these states would be outliers, it would be far easier for the 
Court to hold their restrictions unconstitutional. Instead of the 
Court choosing its own line and then imposing it on all of the 
states simultaneously, the Court could point to the laws created 
by the majority of states as evidence that these outlier states 
were not protecting women's rights adequately. In addition, it 
would be far easier for the Court to show that these legislatures 
had not seriously engaged with the substantive guidelines the 
Court set out in its initial opinion- to give women a right to pro-
153. See Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. I 13. 146-47 & n.41: GARROW. supra note 108. at 
539. 
154. 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (striking down parts of Georgia's abortion law). 
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teet their health and life throughout the pregnancy and give 
women a reasonable time and a fair and realistic opportunity to 
decide whether or not to take on the obligations of motherhood. 
Finally, by leaving the length of the second right up to legis-
latures in the first instance, the Court would, ironically, have 
empowered defenders of abortion rights far more than it did by 
imposing a single national solution in Roe v. Wade. Roe's trimes-
ter formula-which effectively imposed a model abortion statute 
on the entire country-simultaneously gave pro-choice forces a 
enormous victory and seriously demobilized them. Faced with 
mounting pro-life opposition, defenders of abortion rights re-
peatedly diverted resources to litigation because they assumed 
that the federal judiciary would ultimately back them up. But if 
courts had guaranteed only the basic outlines of a right to abor-
tion and left many of the details of abortion regulation open, 
pro-choice advocates would have been forced to devote their re-
sources to gaining public support for abortion rights and forging 
political compromises that would win in legislatures and would 
appeal to a broad segment of the American public. Having to 
fight the details of abortion regulation in the political process 
would probably have helped secure both the democratic charac-
ter and the democratic legitimacy of abortion rights. 
Of course, this not what the Supreme Court did in Roe. 
Rather, it imposed a single solution to the second right to abor-
tion in 1973. As a result, the federal judiciary has gradually been 
pushed toward a compromise position anyway through decades 
of social movement mobilization against abortion rights, through 
the transformation of one of the two major political parties into 
a pro-life party that eventually dominated American politics, 
and through a series of Republican judicial appointments that 
often put abortion rights on an insecure footing. Indeed, al-
though the Casey opinion suggested that it was reaffirming the 
"central holding"1'' of Roe, it actually overturned significant 
elements of Roe v. Wade and moved toward a new judicially-
created compromise. To be sure, it was not necessarily the best 
political settlement that pro-choice forces might have otherwise 
obtained: it allowed state legislatures to deny the nation's most 
vulnerable women-particularly poor women and women living 
in rural areas- their effective rights to abortion while doing little 
to stem the resentment and determination of pro-life forces. But 
155. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 505 U.S. 833. 860-
61.864-65.873.879. 
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a compromise it was, nevertheless. The history of abortion law 
from Roe v. Wade onward shows the familiar lesson of American 
constitutional politics- the Court is part of the dominant na-
tional coalition, and no matter how much it insists that it is 
above everyday politics, the Supreme Court's doctrines will 
eventually gravitate toward the center of public opinion. The 
real question is on what terms it will gravitate. Given these facts, 
the Court could have saved itself a great deal of needless trou-
ble, put abortion rights on more secure footing, and shown 
greater respect for democracy if it had engaged in a more con-
scious process of interaction with Congress and state legislatures 
over the scope of the second right to abortion. 
Does this mean that the Court should now overturn the vi-
ability rule and return the scope of the second right to the states? 
As noted earlier, even without Roe, most states would probably 
guarantee a qualified right to abortion, but many- perhaps up to 
a dozen-would ban almost all abortions. That might sound 
promising for a the sort of approach I advocate, but unfortunately, 
one cannot turn the clock back to the early 1970's and start all 
over again. The current political structure in the United States has 
been produced in part because of the controversy over Roe v. 
Wade, and many judges have been appointed to the bench in sig-
nificant part because of their opinions about Roe. Those judges 
who would be willing to return abortion regulation to the states at 
this point are the same judges who would be delighted to elimi-
nate the constitutional right to abortion completely. It is very 
unlikely that, once Roe were overruled, and states left to design 
their own abortion laws, that the Supreme Court would then rein-
state a national constitutional right to abortion, even if most states 
subsequently guaranteed some form of a right. Once the Court re-
turned the issue of abortion to the states, it would be very hard for 
a future court to impose a national rule against outlier states once 
more. Like it or not, if one thinks that the Court was correct that 
there is a constitutional right to abortion (albeit for different rea-
sons than stated in Roe), it is probably better to work within the 
Roe/Casey framework than to hope that by overturning it one 
would obtain something that better protected the constitutional 
rights of women. Unlike an expectation originalist, I do not think 
that the Court recognized a right that it should not have, and that 
we are stuck with that right because of reliance or stare decisis. 
The Court correctly recognized that there was a right to abortion; 
but its construction of how to protect that right- the trimester sys-
tem- was flawed. Since then it has moved to a new construction 
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that is probably the best one can do under the political circum-
stances produced by the original decision. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Roe v. Wade and the right to abortion have often been 
viewed as a controversial symbol of a "living constitution" that 
cuts itself adrift from the Constitution's text and history and, in 
the view of its critics, becomes no more than a question of con-
temporary politics exercised by the judiciary. This is a false por-
trait reflecting a false dichotomy between fidelity to the constitu-
tional text and a living Constitution. The Constitution, and 
particularly the Fourteenth Amendment, was written with the 
future in mind. Its drafters deliberately chose broad language 
embracing broad principles of liberty and equality. 
Fidelity to the Constitution means applying its text and its 
principles to our present circumstances, and making use of the 
entire tradition of opinions and precedents that have sought to 
vindicate and implement the Constitution. Reasonable people 
may disagree on what those principles mean and how they 
should apply. But the larger point about constitutional interpre-
tation remains. We decide these questions by reference to text 
and principle, applying them to our own time and our own situa-
tion, and in this way making the Constitution our own. The con-
versation between past commitments and present generations is 
at the heart of constitutional interpretation. That is why we do 
not face a choice between living constitutionalism and fidelity to 
the original meaning of the text. The two are opposite sides of 
the same coin. 
